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Sarah C. Melville, *The Campaigns of Sargon II King of Assyria, 721-705 B.C.* (Campaigns and Commanders, 55) (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), pp. 320, ISBN: 978-0806154039.

Tal Tovy (Bar-Ilan University, Israel)

Sargon II became the ruler of the Assyrian Empire in 721 B.C.E., after his predecessor Shalmaneser V had been killed during a punitive campaign against the Kingdom of Israel. The empire that Sargon inherited was threatened by multiple security problems, both internal and external. This reality led Sargon to a series of wars both against the nations that his predecessors had conquered and against the neighboring powers. By the time of his death (705 B.C.E), after 16 years in power, Sargon left an empire extending from the Persian Gulf to the eastern shores of the Mediterranean and from Armenia in the North to the deserts of Arabia in the South. In the West, Assyria even conquered a considerable part of Egypt. Sargon II left his son Sennacherib a vast empire with safe borders and internal stability.

In her book, Professor Sarah Melville examines the many wars that Sargon II conducted in great detail, embedding them in a wide historical framework, which brings out the political, economic and cultural history of Assyria, one of the most prominent empires of the Ancient Near East. Before moving on to the review, I must confess the fact that I am neither an expert in ancient history nor in the history of the Assyrian Empire. My area of research is focused on the Western military art and science at the beginning of the Modern Era, and thus my review relates to Professor Melville's book as a study having a significant potential contribution for researchers of military history, which can help them better understand the universality of this discipline.

The first chapter of the book describes the Assyrian military system and the political, social, economic and cultural factors that helped in turning Assyria into a lethally effective military power. The Assyrian army consisted of several types of military units, combining to forge a synergetic military force. The backbone of the Assyrian army consisted of professional soldiers, supported by militia forces and mercenaries. Such a force typically included units of infantry, archers, slingers, lancers, cavalry, battle chariots and combat engineers, specializing in siege warfare. This combined arms force succeeded in realizing the imperial aspirations and carrying out the operational plans of the Assyrian kings and Sargon II in particular. This important chapter introduces the reader to the sophistication of the Assyrian army and explains how it became such an effective war machine. This chapter is also important for understanding the importance of deploying a heterogeneous military force, demonstrating how the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.

Following this introductory analysis, Melville dedicates the rest of the book to the character of Sargon II who, by his political and military actions, succeeded in making Assyria one of the most powerful empires of the Ancient Near East. However, the writer sometimes stops the portrayal of the chronology in favor of historiographic discussions, important to those who study the Ancient Near East, including the history of the Assyrian Empire. The last part of the book deals with Sargon's last years in power and the construction of a new imperial capital at Dur-Sharrukim (in today's Northern

Iraq). The new capital may be a testimony to Sargon's political ambition to reside in a capital that is associated with his military achievements for the Assyrian Empire, rather than with his predecessors. The rest of the last part deals with Sargon II's death and legacy and with the reign of his son Sennacherib, on whose shoulders imposed the huge task of maintaining his father's achievements. In this extensive analysis, based on diverse primary and archeological sources, Melville succeeds in portraying one of the most important kings of the Assyrian Empire. Thus, the writer illuminates not only the modus operandi of the Assyrian imperialism and Assyria's place in the geopolitical fabric of the era but also positions Sargon II among the great conquerors of antiquity.

For military historians, who do not necessarily specialize in ancient history, the importance of this book lies in adding a tier to the understanding of the universal essence of strategy and statesmanship. Reading about the military campaigns of Sargon II, which the book describes in great detail, brings out several strategic insights that have been relevant throughout history until today.

Assyria's diplomatic and military policy during Sargon's era was clearly influenced by the rivalry with the neighboring powers. This is a reminder of the fact that a state's effective power should always be measured against the environment (sometimes global) in which it operates. Albeit a state's geographic position is fixed, its geopolitical position is relative. This relative position has a critical influence on the state's foreign and security policy. A second lesson is that the level of human and material resources which a state can raise is an integral component of its status as a power or its aspirations to become one.

Studying Sargon's wars against the neighboring powers brings on an additional universal insight: We cannot expect strong states to live peacefully, especially if they have a common border. Hans J. Morgenthau, who is considered one of the founders of the realistic school of international relations theory, wrote in his influential book *Politics among Nations* (1948) that "history shows that nations active in international politics are continuously preparing for, actively involved in, or recovering from organized violence in the form of war."[1] This statement is indicative of a state's constant striving to obtain political, economic and military power, in order to realize national interests or to defend them. The national interests and the will to obtain or increase power are the forces that motivate every state. Thus, the international system is an unstable system, unless there is a balance in the power of the states, i.e. if a balance of power exists that will prevent any state from attempting to realize its interests at the expense of the others, a state which is probably unattainable.

According to this paradigm, the striving for security and power implies that the strengthening of one state will generate a feeling of insecurity (either real or imaginary) of the other. This determinism generates a vicious cycle of

[1] Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, Fourth edition (New York: Knopf, 1967), 36.

hostility and violence, as Assyria has experienced and as, if we make a jump in time, we can simplistically describe the continuing confrontation in Europe between the Italian Wars at the beginning of the Modern Era (1494-1559) and 1945. The second part of this paradigm states that small states, trapped between the big powers or at their periphery, often become game pieces in inter-power politics. Sometimes such small states will seek the protection of the big powers, while, in other cases, the powers, in order to minimize friction and the potential for confrontation, divide control of the small states between them. Either way, such small states tend to lose their independence to a certain extent; sometimes they even lose it completely.

The last historical lesson has to do with the character of the Assyrian army. The manner in which a political entity builds its military power tells us both about the strategic reality that it is facing and as well as about its national aspirations and intentions, and the threats which it faces. Military power can be used in three distinct manners: The first way is the use of power for the preservation of status quo, i.e. trying to maintain the equilibrium existing at a specific historical moment, which usually has its roots in the agreements which had ended the last war. The second way is the attempt to increase the power via imperial expansion. This policy attempts to disrupt the status quo, i.e. to change the balance of power between two or more states. This mode of operation is usually taken when the imperialistic power perceives itself as stronger than other states, especially compared to the states toward which the expansion effort is directed. The third way is demonstrating the state's power by its employment. By such a demonstration of power, the state attempts to increase its regional or international prestige. Military power is not an absolute quantity: history has many examples of massive changes in the relative or absolute power of empires. Additionally, military power is not a political goal by itself, but rather a supporting instrument for the attainment of political goals. In other words, military power should support the state in achieving wider political goals; States that have subordinated their economy to the strengthening of their military force, usually ended up collapsing, not necessarily because of external enemies.

As mentioned above, the process of developing military power can testify to the national goals of the state: A state having global aspirations will usually build a military force of a size and quality suitable for the realizations of these goals. Thus, military power should be tested by the principles of the state's foreign policy, i.e. is it capable of executing the foreign policy set by the political leadership. This claim is true not only for the armies of the Modern Era. Melville's analysis of the Assyrian army and the wars of Sargon II can serve as a test case proving this claim, since the Assyrian army was built in order to realize Assyria's imperialist aspirations. Thus the book can serve as a trigger for future research, examining such processes by comparing different armies, belonging to different civilizations at different times.

The book is well written, drawing from a wide selection of primary sources and backed by massive secondary literature. This is an important book about one of the most prominent political and military leaders of the ancient Near East. There is no doubt in my mind that anybody dealing with this era will find it highly interesting, since the writer deals in detail with issues which do not

only concern military history, but rather embeds the military aspects within the political and cultural context of the period. Thus we can conclude that war is not a stand-alone event and that when studying wars, the researcher must embed them within a wider historical context. Students of military history, especially those who are concerned with strategic issues and with processes of military power building, will also find this book interesting, because it demonstrates the historical universality of these domains, and thus it is relevant not only to researchers of Assyria or of the empires of the ancient Near East but also to researchers of military history in other eras and different geographical and cultural domains.

Jennifer T. Roberts, *The Plague of War: Athens, Sparta, and the Struggle for Ancient Greece* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), pp. 448, ISBN: 978-0199996643.

Samuel Žilinčík (Masaryk University, Czech Republic)

The result of a war is never absolute

At one moment in the process of writing his history of the war between Athenians and Peloponnesians, Athenian general Thucydides expressed his hope for his work to be useful forever. The contemporary state of research seems to vindicate his desire. In the field of international relations, he is cited frequently, perhaps too frequently, with regard to the causes of war and structural dynamics of the international system. In the field of strategic studies, he is often invoked as fundamental text describing the complex interaction of war, politics, and strategy. In the field of classical history, the war he described is still analyzed from different perspectives. A new book by Jenifer T. Roberts, a distinguished expert on the topic of classical Greece from City College in New York, is yet another testament that his desired purpose has been fulfilled.

While there are many decent works on the history of the Peloponnesian War, Roberts' book goes far beyond Thucydides. It is essentially a historical narrative of war and peace as experienced by the most important city-states of Classical Greece. Similar to Thucydides, Roberts starts her narrative with the Greco-Persian Wars (499-449 B.C.), but she does not stop at the moment of Athenian defeat at Aigospotamoi in 450 B.C. Her narrative continues all the way down to the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea when Spartans met their bane at the hands of Thebans and their exceptional general Epaminondas. This is because, in Robert's view, only the aftermath of these battles constitutes the real end of the Peloponnesian War.

The structure of the book is pretty straightforward and linear, yet there are also interesting chapters providing some background context on the role of religion, trade or the art of warfare. The scope of the book is very ambitious, but limited number of pages does not allow exploring all the events in equal depth. This is understandable and excusable, as there are many other publications going in greater depth with regard to specific episodes. Roberts' book is great at what it wants to be – an overview of war and peace throughout the history of classical Greece.

It is hard to overstate the professionalism and style of Roberts' writing. It is very engaging and captivating. It is hard to put the book down, even for someone who knows what happens next at any given moment. Roberts is at her best when she describes realities of war in ancient Greece. For example, her description of the typical hoplite battle:

> (a battle) was terrifying under the best of circumstances—the difficulty of seeing through the helmet, the insufferable heat inside the armor (quite possibly complicated by the hot urine and excrement of the petrified soldier), the clanging of weapons, the slippery ground soaked with blood, the choking dust everywhere, the groans of the dead and the dying. (p. 22)

But the work also has great analytical value. When explaining the success of Athenians in the naval battle, Roberts claims that: "Phormio, the experienced

seaman, was waiting for the dawn and the easterly wind that he knew came with it, blowing out of the Corinthian Gulf. (It still blows today.) And then he felt the wind, and saw the Peloponnesian ships thrown into chaos." (p. 92) One can for sure imagine why and how the ensuing massacre of Peloponnesians happened. But the author also does a great job in discussing and analyzing higher levels of the war such as the strategies of the belligerents, their particular goals, and means and the fundamental assumptions upon which they relied.

Roberts' approach is also very active and daring, she does not shy away from questioning Thucydides or other sources and she often challenges their assumptions or conclusions. For example, she rejects Thucydides's assertion that the outbreak of the war was inevitable. She claims:

> Rather, the war was the product of a perfect storm of coincidences that combined with Athens' proclivity for provoking Sparta's allies—allies on which Sparta was dependent first for support against its helot population and second for naval forces … to complement its own infantry in the event that war did come... Just as there was nothing inevitable about the outbreak of the war, so there was nothing predestined about the course it took. Every decision, every near miss and narrow escape, contributed to its outcome. (pp. 47-8).

Throughout the book, Roberts sheds light on the complicated processes of party politics in direct democracies and in oligarchies and on the messy processes of peace negotiations. At the same time, she does a great job with a lively and accurate portrayal of important characters such as wise Pericles, restrained Archidamus, ambitious Alcibiades and cunning Lysander. This high-quality content is complemented by useful pictures depicting maps, arms or pottery.

The book should provide useful information for undergraduate students of classical Greece, but it will be particularly useful for students of international relations and strategic studies, as they are so often inclined to rely on fancy quotes from Thucydides without questioning the author's assertions. Roberts' book also questions several narratives taken as granted in contemporary international relations. One of the most prevalent and misguided is the assumption that we live in a completely unique period of history, in the age of wars without ends. Yet this state of affairs is in no way unique to our times. As Robert's book demonstrates, history is to a great extent military history. Wars decline and reappear again in another place, but they never vanish altogether. One prominent strategic thinker once wrote that the result of a war is never absolute.[1] Roberts' book constitutes an excellent reminder of that simple fact.

[1] *The Book of War: Sun-Tzu's "The Art of War" & Karl Von Clausewitz's "On War"*, introduced by Ralph Peters (New York: The Modern Library, 2000), 270.

Christopher L. Scott, *The Maligned Militia: The West Country Militia of the Monmouth Rebellion, 1685* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 333, ISBN: 978-1472437716.

Jeffrey Shaw (US Naval War College)

History is often presented from a single vantage point, and where military history is concerned, that vantage point is usually that of the victor. The Monmouth Rebellion of 1685 is no exception. Also known as the West Country Rebellion, this failed effort to overthrow King James II significantly influenced English politics well into the next few centuries. Contemporary accounts of this rebellion most often assume that the militia forces deployed by the king were inefficient and unwieldy, and that only the professional forces were able to effectively put an end to the uprising. Scott reevaluates the militia's performance, and his book succeeds in presenting a convincing case that in fact, the militia performed admirably and the king's victory should be seen as validation of their battlefield performance.

Christopher Scott is among the most highly qualified historians in the field of seventeenth century British history. He is the author of *The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion*[1] and a noted expert on many aspects of British military history. He has travelled extensively over the battlefields about which he writes. His meticulous attention to detail brings the militia of the Monmouth Rebellion to life. Examining primary source material, Scott's conclusions are well supported. The narrative begins with an examination of the militia's military effectiveness, tracing their history and providing a glimpse at their training and composition. The next few chapters provide even greater detail on the militias, with a chapter on Organization providing what is likely the most detailed and complete examination of the English militias available in print. A breakdown of the number of troops from each particular militia organization, along with the names of commanders and tables of organization make this chapter the equivalent of an entire stand-alone book.

Scotts' study continues with a chapter that explains how the militias were mustered, paid, and brought into service. This detailed examination relies heavily on fundraising records and pay tables to provide the reader with a wealth of detail that may at first appear secondary, but Scott fits this information nicely into the narrative, providing a chronological structure which keeps the story flowing. Additional chapters look at the militia's drill and training, and then the narrative delves into the particulars of the Monmouth Rebellion, focusing specifically on the very important role played by the militia, and why Scott believes their part in the Monmouth Rebellion deserves to be re-evaluated.

In his evaluation of the militia's performance during the Monmouth Rebellion, Scott provides remarkably concise lists of how far each unit had to march before engaging in battle. For example, on page 195, readers will find a

[1] Christopher Scott, *The Armies and Uniforms of the Monmouth Rebellion* (Leigh-on-Sea: Partizan Press, 2008).

list of "The marches of Wyndhams' Regiment in 1685." This incredibly detailed list show exactly how far each unit had to march, demonstrating that "during 22 days on campaign Wyndham's regiment of Militia covered approximately 212 miles at an average rate of $9^{2/3}$ miles per day, or approximately, $13^{1/3}$ miles per day in 16 days marching" (p. 195). This level of detail lends support to the authors' assertion that the militia not only accounted for itself well in battle, but also left a remarkable record of mobility and maneuverability prior to the fighting.

Scott's research is impeccable, providing support for his conclusion that the militias deserve a more equitable treatment in the historical record. Statements such as "Despite a popular misconception that the West Country, with its high proportion of dissenting residents, was ripe for resistance to the commands of a Catholic king, a study of religious affiliation reveals that the numbers of both Catholics and Nonconformists in these counties and cities were relatively small and that corresponding numbers in the militia would have been inconsequential" (p. 272), lend an air of authority to his assessment that the militia's reputation as indecisive and ineffective may need to be reconsidered.

The bibliography in this book is a very useful source for those who wish to continue their examination of Monmouth's Rebellion. In addition, Scott has included a very thorough index, and a list of useful websites that one can reference in order to add to the historical narrative. There are also some very helpful maps, as well as select black and white illustrations which illustrate the soldiers involved in the rebellion. An appendix provides lists of names of the combatants and muster rolls for the militias.

Readers interested in the Monmouth Rebellion or in British military history will definitely want to get a copy of Christopher Scott's *The Maligned Militia*. It offers the scholar a counterargument to the idea that the militia units performed poorly in this important episode in British military and political history. It also offers the general reader an interesting and riveting account of warfare in the seventeenth century. It is highly recommended.

Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo, *The Carrera Revolt and 'Hybrid Warfare' in Nineteenth-Century Central America* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 107, ISBN: 978-3319583402.

Jeffrey Hawkes (Northern Arizona University)

Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo believes that looking at revolutions and wars of history through the lens of hybrid warfare allows for a more comprehensive understanding of military operations that have altered the paths of Central American nations. He employs this approach to better understand Rafael Carrera's success in the Conservative rebellions of Guatemala in the 1830s. He argues that hybrid warfare paired with a society militarized by Spanish Bourbon Reforms allowed for the unlikely military success of Rafael Carrera and his rebels against better-trained government forces. To better understand the concept of hybrid warfare, he defines his version of hybrid warfare based on military sources and uses compound warfare as a framework for understanding the uniqueness of hybrid warfare. Visoni-Alonzo describes hybrid warfare is not exactly the same as compound warfare but is "a type of combat that combines classical guerrilla recruiting tactics and rural insurgency logistics with mostly conventional combat tactics and operations" (p. 1). He believes a more thorough history of guerrilla warfare is necessary to understand the context of the Carrera Revolt in Guatemala.

Visoni-Alonzo spends a fair amount of time explaining the history of guerrilla warfare and how it evolved over time. He distinguished guerilla warfare from irregular warfare in that it must "be sustained over a significant period of time and must have specific medium or long-term goals" (p. 13). This succinct definition for guerrilla war, however, is not present throughout all of history. In fact, Visoni-Alonzo explains the Sumerians showed the first signs of a regular, standardized army rather than an insurgent-style force. From these beginnings, guerrilla warfare emerged as a tactic for outmatched military units to successfully resist more powerful, trained armies. He outlines the evolution of guerrilla warfare through Celtiberian tribes rebelling against a powerful Roman Empire, the military adoption of *la petite guerre* in France, insurgent groups known as *partidas* fighting against Napoleonic invasions in Iberia, and more recent guerrilla fighting during the United States Civil War and Anglo-Boer wars. The evolution of guerrilla warfare ends with the Carrera Revolt, tying Carrera's military insurrections to the long history of guerrilla warfare.

Carrera's success, however, required more than just guerrilla warfare. Visoni-Alonzo argues that the militarization of colonial Spanish American society spurred by the Bourbon Reforms instituted by Charles III helped to enable Carrera's victory against the governmental forces of the Central American Federation. Formal military training in colonial Spanish America, brought about by the Bourbon Reforms, introduced the society to a conventional, disciplined warfare. The reforms also called for the widespread formation of militia groups throughout the Americas to better defend Spain's colonies. Because of the lack of *peninsulares* and *criollos*, these militia groups were made up of non-Spaniards such as *mestizos*, *ladinos*, and *pardos*. Thus, non-privileged groups seen as lesser in Spanish America also partook in the militarization introducing them to military tactics, discipline, violence, and the

strategies of fighting. This militarization of these groups of people would later facilitate rebellion and fuel combative insurgency against the Liberal government's views of the Central American Federation.

What makes the Carrera Revolt unique is the use of hybrid warfare to defeat a seemingly better equipped and prepared force. While Carrera did use guerrilla warfare tactics to combat Francisco Morazán and other governmental commanders, he skillfully supplemented guerrilla tactics with conventional warfare. This hybrid warfare allowed Carrera to take full advantage of his willing rebel followers, the mountainous terrain, and the military numbers of the opposing forces. He dissolved his army when necessary, hid out in the forest and mountains, assembled larger forces to conventionally combat Morozán, and often tricked government forces with guerrilla tactics. As Visoni-Alonzo says, "Carrera's use of his brand of hybrid warfare brings together successfully the three elements of military success: the tactical, the operational, and the strategic." (p. 101) Thus, Carrera succeeded in the revolt against the Liberal government.

The extensive chapter focused on defining guerrilla warfare prefaces the military methods of the Carrera Revolt, but perhaps lacks an important insight of guerrilla warfare. Since Visoni-Alonzo already uses more modern sources, such as writings from Mao Tse-tung, to help define guerrilla warfare, the inclusion of ideas from Che Guevara's *Guerrilla Warfare*[1] could provide helpful insights on guerrilla warfare in Latin America. While the content of the Guevara's book post-dates the Carrera Revolt, his ideas certainly add to the definition of guerrilla warfare. Also, Visoni-Alonzo, while aptly pointing out the importance of militarization and hybrid warfare in the Carrera Revolt, seems to disregard the importance of multiple insurrections in other parts of the Central American Federation in helping Carrera's victory. He does point out briefly other rebellions in Nicaragua, Honduras, and the *Los Altos* region in Guatemala, but does not mention the possibility that Carrera's success came partly from the overall disarray of the Central American Federation. Surely the multiple rebellions stretched government forces and resources thin making Carrera's hybrid warfare that much more effective. Nevertheless, Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo's book is an enlightening, well-written, and detailed account of the benefits of hybrid warfare in Nineteenth-Century Central America.

Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo makes sound and intriguing arguments for the effectiveness of hybrid warfare in the Carrera Revolt in Nineteenth-Century. By delineating the definition of guerrilla warfare throughout history, one can see how Carrera certainly employs tactics used by many before him. This also shows just how much Carrera's tactics differed from simple guerrilla warfare. Visoni-Alonzo's assertion that Carrera successfully combined guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare is a key to the importance of Visoni-Alonzo's book in understanding hybrid warfare and Nineteenth-Century warfare in Central America. Without this work, one may view Rafael Carrera and his revolutionary contemporaries as merely untrained insurgents blessed with unlikely victories. Visoni-Alonzo successfully refutes that view and backs up his claims with sufficient research and evidence from numerous sources,

[1] Ernesto Che Guevara, *Guerrilla Warfare* (LaVergne, TN: BN Publishing, 2016).

especially Rafael Carrera's dictated memoirs. Also, Visoni-Alonzo's suggestions of looking at other wars during the same century through the lens of hybrid wars offers a new and promising opportunity for understanding of each war. Through this lens, future scholars can explore new narratives that delve into interpretations that differ from traditional ones.

Michael M. Walker, *The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew* (Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 2017), pp. 400, ISBN: 978-0700623754.

Larry A. Grant (The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina)

The Chinese–Russian border is the world's sixth-longest international border. The first official contacts between Tsarist Russia and what would become the Manchu Qing dynasty came in the middle of the seventeenth century as Russian Cossacks pushed into the Amur River basin. After the Qing army ejected the Russians from their posts on the Amur, the two states signed the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the first of several border treaties in 1689. The tensions between the two great powers persisted until the signing of a Sino-Soviet Border agreement in 1991 shortly before the disintegration of the USSR necessitated a new border arrangement between China, and the newly independent Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

With the exception of an era of ideological comity that existed between Soviet Russian and Communist China that lasted from 1949 to 1958, the historical pattern of relations between China and Russia since those first clashes has been marked by mutual suspicion and periodic conflict, most recently in 1969. The border region was similarly contested after the Japanese took control of the region from the Chinese during the 1930s. An undeclared border war continued until the Japanese Army was defeated decisively by the Soviets at Khalkin-Gol in eastern Mongolia.

In the twentieth century at the center of much of the regional conflict in Manchuria was the issue of control of the railroads and the territory they crossed. Michael M. Walker's book, *The 1929 Sino-Soviet War*, explores in great depth one of the numerous conflicts that helped to shape the story of Manchuria as the antagonists fought for control of the land, its infrastructure, and its wealth.

Michael M. Walker, a retired Marine colonel, is a Special Projects Docent at the Idaho Military History Museum in Boise. During his active service he commanded the 3rd Civil Affairs Group in Iraq and also served in various infantry and staff intelligence billets. His tour as an intelligence officer on the United States Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, G-2 staff (i.e. the staff component charged with providing intelligence support to planning and operations components) together with his civil affairs perspective almost certainly gives him a unique and complex insight from which to examine the subject of this history.

Walker's study of the 1929 Sino-Soviet War offers an interesting look at how events played out nearly a century ago in an extremely complex political environment. He tracks events in great detail in the years leading up to the conflict to provide the reader with a meticulous framework for the war. His description of the campaigns of the participants is further enhanced by chapters that place the 1929 war into its interwar context before concluding with a discussion of its consequences.

The expansion of railroads into Manchuria coincided with the construction of the Trans-Siberian railroad by Russia. In 1896, China, weakened by its recent defeat by the Japanese, was forced to grant to Russia the

right to build a railroad across Manchuria to Vladivostok. Along with control of the new Chinese Eastern Railway (CER), the unequal treaty also gave Russia considerable autonomy in Chinese territory. A short time later Russia gained the right to add another line south from Harbin along the *Liaodong Peninsula* to the new Russian naval port at Port Arthur. Ostensibly a joint venture, the Qing Chinese government had little ability to control Russian activities.

This arrangement was increasingly thrown into confusion in the first two decades of the twentieth century as first the Qing government and then the Tsarist Russian government were overthrown by revolutionary forces in the two countries. Both governments for a time lost the ability to assert effective control in the area as other forces arose to fill the power vacuum. By the 1920s, with Russia caught up in civil war, control of the CER had become a source of conflict between the weak Chinese central government and warlords. By the end of the '20s with Moscow once again engaging in Manchuria, the governments in Beijing and Moscow and the Manchurian warlords all jockeyed for regional influence and control as the Japanese Army lurked in the wings.

The 1929 Sino-Soviet War contains a very complex cast of characters, and the early chapters deal extensively with the Chinese side of the story, focusing primarily on the many Chinese political actors. This intricate network includes both agents of the "official" national government, key warlords and subordinates who acted to advance their own interests. The discussion of similar individuals on the Soviet side seems less extensive, probably because there was much less fragmentation on the Soviet side where, by 1929, Joseph Stalin and the Communist Party had assumed total control in Russian territories.

This highlights one of the difficulties the reader will face when reading *The 1929 Sino-Soviet War*. A quick reference to all of the key players indicating basic linkages between them would have been helpful. The index gives access to the information in the text, but it is not as efficiently employed by the reader as a visual wiring diagram in one location would have been. Something similar to appendix B, which lists the names of various location mentioned in the text would have worked, though even here several maps showing the principle locations mentioned would have been more helpful to the reader than a list.

It is worth emphasizing this point. Too many military histories skimp on maps. As the subtitle of *The 1929 Sino-Soviet War* says, this was "*The War Nobody Knew.*" If nobody knew (or knows) the war, it is equally fair to say they probably were (and are) unfamiliar with the lay of the land. Though not listed in the table of contents, there are three maps included in the text that show two of the battleground areas along the Sino-Soviet border. The maps include major terrain features like rivers, cities, and rail routes, but troop movements are not shown on the maps, and other military operations (e.g. the Sungari River operation) do not appear on any map.

Walker includes an extensive list of notes—more than 50 pages—but endnotes have the drawback of forcing the reader to interrupt the stream of the narrative—something not to be done lightly in this case—to search about the back of the book for the reference. Footnotes, and not endnotes, are greatly preferred by readers, and in an age when manuscripts are produced on word

processors, authors and publishers have little excuse to force readers to the back of the book.

Walker has produced an interesting history of a little known war in a region that will almost certainly loom large in Eurasian affairs in the near future. Modern China is undertaking the construction of a modern Silk Road, the Belt and Road Initiative that will stretch from Beijing to Europe. The BRI is a massive economic undertaking meant to tie the region more closely together. As Franklin Allen, professor of finance and economics at Imperial College London, has said, "It is an economic initiative, but along the way China will expand its military bases and so forth. On the sea routes they will develop their military capability and on the land routes, too."[1] As with earlier routes, this new road will become a focus for national and international policies and perhaps for power projection in much the same way as the Manchurian railroads of old. Walker's surprisingly timely work is sure to be of interest to anyone who curious about the history of this intricate region and its diverse inhabitants.

[1] "Where Will China's 'One Belt, One Road' Initiative Lead?" Knowledge@Wharton, March 22, 2017. Accessed December 07, 2017. http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/can-chinas-one-belt-one-road-initiative-match-the-hype/

James Johns, *Reassessing Pearl Harbor: Scapegoats, a False Hero and the Myth of Surprise Attack* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2015), pp. 228, ISBN: 978-1476668277.

Anthony Calandrillo (Drew University)

In *Reassessing Pearl Harbor: Scapegoats, a False Hero and the Myth of Surprise Attack*, James Johns adds to the already monumental number of books written about the day that will live in infamy, as President Franklin D. Roosevelt so aptly christened December 7, 1941. And it is President Roosevelt who sits at the very heart of Johns' thesis concerning the Japanese attack and the extensive fallout that the attack caused. For Johns, the president should shoulder most of the blame for the attack. In the words of the author, "The premise of this book is that the president and his cabinet, with the aid of the Democratic platform, had the ability to make the decision as to when the United States would enter World War II." (p. 6) To this end, Johns creates a chronological discussion of the significant events of the pre-war years and a very detailed analysis of the year 1941, when, as the author asserts, many momentous decisions were made or avoided. Though there is a chronological frame to this book, Johns uses each of the chapters thematically, with chapter titles including, "Dereliction of Duty," Japan's Targets," The World Stage," "Change of Command," "Lend-Lease and its Delivery," "Spy Warnings," "Negotiations," and "Final Warnings." The last two chapters cover the actual attack on Pearl Harbor and the investigation and aftermath.

Johns uses these chapter designations as the framework for his argument against the Roosevelt administration. Within every chapter is a discussion of how the Roosevelt administration contributed to the massive failure at Pearl Harbor. In the first chapter, "Dereliction of Duty," Johns lays out his perspective on the Roberts Commission, the body created by the Roosevelt administration to investigate the attacks. In this chapter, Johns makes the point that the investigation was only allowed to focus on the army and navy, a revelation, according to the author, that allows the investigators to, "exclude examination of any high-level civilian authorities in the chain of command." (p. 12.) Johns later claims that the commission would, "follow the president's instructions to the letter and point all blame for the surprise attack to Hawaii with no shadow cast of Washington whatsoever." (p. 15) While all of this may be true, does it support the assertion that Roosevelt and his administration acted in a malicious manner, as the author asserts? Or is this simply a case of scapegoating the local commanders? What good would have come of sending blame up to the White House if that could have even been proven? The full story was never available in 1942, and if there is criticism of Roberts Commission to be found, it is in the harsh condemnation of Admiral Husband E. Kimmel and General Walter C. Short. The commission's report proves nothing otherwise. This kind of leap of logic is sprinkled all through this book. Another example can be found in chapter four, when Johns discusses a warning from the Peruvian ambassador to Japan regarding Japanese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. (p. 53) The author pairs this with a Japanese order to Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku to plan for an attack on the base to show that the Peruvian ambassador's warning should have been heeded. (p. 53) This is hindsight and

not an appropriate conclusion to reach when trying to examine American thinking in 1941. One last example of Johns' leaps is in his discussion of the Vacant Sea Order of November 25 1941. This order was designed to reroute all US shipping from East Asia south through the Torres Strait between Australia and New Guinea rather than go through the central Pacific as was normal practice. Rather than see this as a way to avoid having merchant ships in harm's way should hostilities break out, Johns ascribes this order to Roosevelt's desire to go to war against Japan. He concludes that, "In essence, it would clear the route of the Kido Butai in that if they were sighted by any commercial or military ship, it could blow the surprise, and [Commander of the Japanese force Vice Admiral Chiuchi Nagumo would be tempted to cancel the attack. In short, this order cleared the way for them." (p. 110) Once again, Johns ascribes a nefarious motive to an otherwise benign move, and does it without providing evidence for his assertions. Another instance of this is in chapter seven, "Negotiations," when Johns writes the following when discussing intelligence on the attack that Roosevelt received on November 26 from British Prime Minister Winston Churchill:

> With less than two weeks left, the president expressed the concern that if one of his intelligence people got this same information, all intelligence people would know it and want to meet the Japanese head-on. And there would go the excuse to go to war with Germany, the number one enemy. FDR decided that he simply would have to be unavailable to make the decision to attack the Japanese task force if sighted. He then commented that he should distance himself from Washington while the scenario unfolded. (p. 113)

This is an accusation that seriously undermines all of the scholarship regarding Roosevelt and his administration's role in the run-up to the attack, yet there is no attribution for this information. The phone call from Churchill is indeed verified, as Johns notes, yet the author does acknowledge using a rather dubious source, Gregory Douglas's *The 1948 Interrogation of Heinrich Muller* for the phone call information. (p. 113) It seems as if the author is viewing events through a pre-determined lens. Given problems such as these, it is difficult to give an unqualified recommendation to this book.

The true virtue of Johns' work is that he asks questions that need to be asked about the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Even though the idea of Roosevelt's blame for the disaster is one that has been explored, even if only in popular history books, Johns' attempt to peel back this particular onion even more is something that can be appreciated by all researchers. Johns is performing an essential task by asking these questions, even if it is seven decades after the Japanese attack. As the author points out, many years passed before supporters of General Short and Admiral Kimmel made headway in their effort to rehabilitate the two disgraced commanders. As new information is revealed, the accepted wisdom regarding any historical event is bound to change. This is exactly what the author is trying to do in *Reassessing Pearl Harbor*. Yet, the author falls short of his goal. Johns makes assumptions that he provides no evidence for, and undertakes leaps of logic that are not supported by the research. The research he has done is incomplete and does not take into account more recent scholarship on the topic, nor does the author allow for any works that may explain the very situation he wants to explore,

such as Roberta Wohlstetter's essential work, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*,[1] Iriye Akira's *Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War*[2] and *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific*[3] all examine the roles of the Roosevelt administration in the build-up to the Pearl Harbor attack in 1941. Primary source documents that go beyond the Roberts Commission report would also have been helpful to the author in attempting to make his point. Based on this, if the sole benefit of this work is to reexamine the questions that surround the Pearl Harbor attacks, then the result of this work is positive. But, as this work demonstrates, more work is needed.

[1] Roberta Wohlstetter, *Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1962).

[2] Akira Iriye, *Pearl Harbor and the Coming of the Pacific War: A Brief History with Documents and Essays* (New York: Bedford/St.Martin 1999).

[3] Akira Iriye, *The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific* (London/New York: Routledge, 1987).

Iain Johnston-White, *The British Commonwealth and Victory in the Second World War* (Studies in Military and Strategic History) (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 319, ISBN: 978-1137589163.

Ian Johnson (Yale University)

Iain Johnston-White, a lecturer in the Department of International Politics at Aberystwyth University, has given us an ambitious new study of the British Commonwealth during the Second World War. He argues that, barring the participation of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, "the UK could not have won the war" (p. vii). In particular, he sees their vital contributions after the Fall of France as having kept the United Kingdom fighting until the enormous manpower and economic resources of the Soviet Union and United States were fully brought to bear against Germany.

Historian R.F. Holland maintained that the great challenge facing Britain's political leaders prior to World War II was the "search for methods to make democratic systems compatible with state interests" in the context of the Empire.[1] Through his work here, Johnston-White has demonstrated to what degree those efforts had succeeded by the outbreak of the war. To make that case, the author has succeeded in marshaling vast, disparate literatures on the war experiences of the four settler-dominions, as well as material on training, logistics, and industrial production. Most of the relevant literature to date has been drawn from a national perspective, such as the *Australia's War* volumes edited by Joan Beaumont, and J.L Granatstein's *Canada's War.*[2] Johnston-White's transnational exploration offers a richer argument and broader evidence base than those previous works on the subject.

Johnston-White's book joins a growing literature on the subject of Commonwealth participation in the war. These have varied in their emphasis, usually focusing more generally on the Empire at large, such as journalist Christopher Somerville's *Our War: How the British Commonwealth Fought the Second World War*. Ashley Jackson's magisterial *The British Empire and the Second World War* also devoted more attention to colonial relationships with Africa and South Asia than with the Dominions. An academic work more focused on the Dominions, Andrew Stewart's *Empire Lost,* appeared in 2008. But Stewart's work was a diplomatic history, emphasizing the narrative of negotiations between the Dominion powers and the British metropole. Johnston-White's work aims to do the opposite: he offers an impressionistic look at the collective war effort through four case studies, rather than a single coherent narrative. In doing so, he largely eschews personalities and leaders in favor of structural arguments about finance, military industry, training, and logistics.

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[1] R.F. Holland, *Britain and the Commonwealth Alliance 1918-1939* (London: MacMillan Press, 1981), 206.

[2] Joan Beaumont, ed. *Australia's War 1914-18* (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1995); J.L. Granatstein, *Canada's War: The Politics of the Mackenzie King Government, 1939-1945*, new edition (Oakville, ON: Rock's Mills Press, 2016).

His four selected case studies cover much of the Dominion contribution to the war effort: finances, air power, naval power, and the land war in North Africa. In the first section, Johnston-White argues that Great Britain depended on financial support from settler dominions in fighting the war, as it exhausted its financial reserves far faster than in the First World War (pp. 33-35). In particular, this assistance came in the form of the Billion Dollar Gift from Canada and large-scale loan forgiveness. South Africa's gold also played an important role in underwriting the value of the pound and purchasing needed equipment from the United States. While Pacific dominions were willing to contribute, they lacked the deep capital markets to add much financially to Commonwealth finances.

Johnston-White next proceeds to explore the contributions of the Commonwealth to collective Imperial air power. In his strongest case study, Johnston-White demonstrates the staggering dependence of the RAF on Dominion training facilities and manpower. During the war, the UK trained "just under 100,000 aircrew; in the same period the three BCATP (Canada, Australia, and New Zealand) Dominions trained over 170,000 aircrew," totaling 46 percent of the British Empire's pilots during the war (pp. 117 and 266). While some of this manpower arrived during the Battle of Britain, the bulk of these personnel became engaged with the RAF from 1942 onwards. Without Commonwealth contributions, the British strategic bombing campaign would have been impossible. That argument, novel to the current reviewer, is a powerful one in supporting the author's thesis.

The third section of the book offers a detailed exploration of Commonwealth naval strategy. Here Johnston-White shows the importance of Commonwealth aid to the Imperial merchant marine, with Canada alone producing more than three and a half million tons of critically needed shipping during the Battle of the Atlantic (p. 166). Indeed, this production alone made the difference between a net gain and net loss in Imperial shipping tonnage during the worst months of the U-Boat campaign. In addition, Canada and Australia developed their own significant naval forces in a very short time, the former to wage war against German U-Boats and the latter to fight the Japanese in the Pacific. Canada, for instance, expanded its navy from 6 to 365 ships in the six years of the war, playing a critical role in the Battle of the Atlantic and escorting a total of more than 25,000 ships to British ports (pp. 175 and 180).

In the work's fourth section, the author explores the war on land, focusing on the North African campaign. Here he offers a detailed examination of the contentious negotiations between the United Kingdom and the Dominions that complicated operations in the desert. He argues that without the manpower contributions from Australia, New Zealand and South Africa, the British position in North Africa and the Middle East would have been untenable. As he shows, about 25 percent of the forces during the critical phase of the campaign were volunteers from the Dominions (p. 228).

The author's central thesis, of the indispensability of the Dominions to British victory, is strongly argued, but perhaps not entirely convincing. He ably shows that their contributions in financial, material, and manpower terms were all of tremendous significance when compared to the British capabilities.

However, the Dominions' collective contributions paled beside the manpower resources of the Soviet Union and the economic might of the United States. The four Dominions studied here collectively suffered around 109,700 civilian and military fatalities, less than half of one percent of Soviet losses in the war. While that should not minimize the bravery of Dominion forces – they were nearly all volunteers, and suffered high proportionate casualties – arguing that their contribution was decisive is a hard case to make.[3] In economic terms, Dominion contribution must also be measured against the other Allies. For instance, the four states studied here produced 2,075 aircraft during the war, less than a quarter of *monthly* US aircraft production by 1944.[4]

The issue of timing also challenges that thesis. The decisive moment when Great Britain had a very real chance of losing the war was between May 1940 and December 1941, when Dominion contributions remained relatively small. As he points out, the Dominions spent miniscule sums on their defense establishments until 1939; it took some time for their forces and industry to become useful additions to British power as a result.[5] While the Dominions clearly played a major role in Great Britain's war effort, arguing that they saved Great Britain from decisive defeat may be stretching the evidence a bit far.

That point should not seriously diminish the value of Johnston-White's study in improving our understanding of the Second World War. His work highlights that British strategic planning was often contingent on Dominion contributions. For instance, the desert campaign in North Africa relied on Dominion soldiers, its timing determined by their availability. Further, he proves the enormous role of Dominion aircrews in the launching of Great Britain's strategic bomber offensive beginning in March 1942 (p. 103). His work also elucidates the timing of Allied victory in the Battle of the Atlantic in light of critical Canadian contributions in 1943.

In addition, Johnston-White has revealed a great deal about the "transition from matriarchal to fraternal" relationship (p. 266) in the British Commonwealth. The story itself has much to tell about the nature of alliances more generally: the staggering willingness of Australians, New Zealanders, and

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[3] Per capita, the Dominion contributions were remarkable: tiny New Zealand suffered the highest proportionate casualties of any Allied combatant other than the Soviet Union. Andrew Stewart, *Empire Lost: Britain, the Dominions, and the Second World War* (London: Continuum UK, 2008), 166.

[4] US aircraft deliveries to its allies amounted to 21 times that total. In total, the Dominions produced 0.7 percent of the aircraft produced by the United States. Norman Polmar, Thomas B. Allen *World War II: the Encyclopedia of the War Years, 1941-1945* (New York: Courier Corporation, 2012), 881.

[5] As Johnston-White points out in the Canadian case, its army contributions peaked after 1943, with the landings in Normandy. The same was true of its naval forces, which enjoyed the greatest role at the Battle of the Atlantic in 1943 and 1944 (p. 179). The biggest financial contributions of Canada, the "Billion Dollar Gift" and the following War Appropriations Act, both came about after the entry of both the Soviet Union and United States into the war.

Canadians to volunteer to fight half a world away on behalf a country not their own is fascinating in its own right. That keenness has long been understood to have undergirded the increasing independence of the Dominions at the end of the war. Here we see the specific ways in which that transformation came about as the nature of Dominion contributions were negotiated.

The British Commonwealth and Victory in the Second World War is a worthy contribution to our understanding of the British Empire at war. Johnston-White should be commended for connecting archival collections from four continents, engaging disparate national literatures, and crossing boundaries between military, economic, and diplomatic history. For historians seeking a broader understanding of the British war effort than the London-centric narrative long entrenched in the history books, this work will be essential reading.

David Motadel, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 2014, First paperback ed., 2017), pp. 512, ISBN: 978-0674979765.

Nathaniel P. Weston (Seattle Central College)

With the failure of the Blitzkrieg after the 1941 invasion of the Soviet Union, Nazi Germany mobilized all available manpower to compensate for its losses and pursue a battlefield victory that forced a Russian surrender. It accomplished neither. Nevertheless, while occupying territories and allying to governments across Europe, North Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia, the German military circulated mass propaganda linking National Socialist ideals to Islam and recruited Muslim men into its service. These are the main subjects of David Motadel's book.

Now in paperback, *Islam and Nazi Germany's War* was originally published in 2014. Over the past decade, several studies of related topics have appeared in English. These include histories of Nazi propaganda directed at the Arab world, the Third Reich's policies toward Palestine, National Socialist portraits of Mustafa Kemal, the founder of modern Turkey, the role of Nazi Germany in the postwar Middle East, and Nazi relations with the Arab world generally.[1] Different from these works, Motadel's book offers a comprehensive discussion of German military and political actions involving Islam during World War II in eight chapters divided into three parts.

The first part locates the roots of Nazi policies toward the Islamic world in studies undertaken in Imperial Germany as part of colonial rule in Africa. Allied to Ottoman Turkey in the First World War, the German Empire aimed its propaganda at Islam around the world in hopes of subverting colonies held by the Entente powers, Motadel shows, though these efforts failed to contribute to military victory. The book demonstrates that scholarship on Islam proceeded from its imperial origins and continued to inform German leaders' thinking about the Muslim world during the 1930s and early stages of WWII. The author's information surrounding certain Muslim leaders' collaboration with Nazi Germany, shifts in ideology from anti-Semitism to anti-Judaism to accommodate policy toward Islam, and the attraction to the Islamic faith among top Nazi leadership, particularly Hitler and Himmler, provide areas of particular interest.

The second part of the work examines German activities involving Muslims as the war unfolded in North Africa, on the Eastern Front, and Balkan Peninsula. Because each region played a different role in the military conflict

[1] Jeffrey Herf, *Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers, *Nazi Palestine: The Plans for the Extermination of the Jews in Palestine*, trans. Krista Smith (New York: Enigma Books, 2010); Stefan Ihrig, *Atatürk in the Nazi Imagination* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); Barry Rubin and Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, *Nazis, Islamists, and the Making of the Modern Middle East* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014); Francis R. Nicosia, *Nazi Germany and the Arab World* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

over time, Motadel demonstrates German responses to Islam varied. Nazis disseminated print and radio propaganda in both North Africa and the Middle East, though these efforts had little to no effect. German administration over the Caucasus, Crimea, and Eastern Europe resulted in the active promotion of Islam in those areas as an explicit reversal of Soviet secularization projects. The author notes that there was difficulty in distinguishing Muslims from Jews sometimes, and that Muslim Roma people sought to protect themselves by identifying as Tatars, though mostly without avail. Readers thus learn that the Holocaust intersected with German policy toward Islam on the Eastern Front.

In Southeast Europe, the case of Croatia, as an ally of Nazi Germany, represented another unique situation. During the progress of the war, Germany eventually took over Croatia and Bosnia and, by extension, the Muslim population in the region. In 1941, a number of Jews converted to both Islam and Catholicism, while Muslim Roma were protected. The Final Solution also manifested in this region, Motadel reveals, though with different results than other territories under German rule.

The third part of the book looks at Muslims in the military. They served in both the Wehrmacht and the SS due to the shortage of manpower on the Eastern Front. Germany used Islam as a recruitment tool, even employing imams as part of its military mobilization. Ultimately, the author concludes that German policies failed. Whether and how they ever could have succeeded in the face of imminent defeat, Motadel does not venture to address.

The book includes fascinating illustrations, including a photograph of a mosque from a WWI POW camp fashioned after the Dome of the Rock and a list of Muslim inmates of concentration camps, to cite two striking examples. The author draws on wide-ranging source materials in archives in Germany, Austria, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Poland, the Czech Republic, Latvia, Ukraine, Croatia, Bosnia, Albania, and Iran. His extensive list of notes attests to his comprehensive coverage of relevant primary and secondary sources. Overall, Motadel exhibits an exemplary grasp of specifics and the complexity of local politics in the areas he discusses.

The book most directly appeals to readers interested in mobilization policies. It does not address, and the author never purports to, Muslims' responses to Nazi Germany, nor whether there were any decisive impacts on particular battlefields. It accomplishes exactly what it sets out to do: describe in detail German projects aimed at Muslim populations in support of the war effort. Motadel's study leads us, like so many other aspects of the history of Nazi Germany and World War II, to ask, "what if …?"

It is interesting that the history of the German National Socialist Workers' Party and the largest war in human history that the party's leader eventually ignited are so prone to fantasy. The Nazi war effort itself fell prey to illusions, foremost that a conflict with the Soviet Union was winnable, but also that occupying large portions of Europe was desirable or even sustainable. German interest in the Islamic world arrived as an afterthought, an expedient measure undertaken once it became clear that the course of military action had strayed from the one initially imagined.

In a notable scene from the 1941 film depicting the Imperial German colonial adventurer Carl Peters, the protagonist liberates a group of sub-

Saharan Africans from a villainous Arab slave trader.[2] Whether the episode intended to heroicize an aspect of the history of the German Empire or whet viewers' appetites for the idea of freeing enslaved people in foreign lands amid the Second World War depends on the interpreter's perspective. On the surface, the scene suggests an anti-Arab and pro-black African stance in Nazi popular culture during WWII, unexpectedly challenging dominant racial ideologies in Germany. Looking deeper, however, the situation operates symbolically with the Arab slave trader standing in for his fellow Semitic-speakers, the Jews, frequently depicted as enslavers, and the sub-Saharan Africans as the peoples of the world, waiting to be released from their bondage by the Nazi liberators embodied by Peters himself. The latter reading thus underscores, rather than undermines, ideas about race in Germany at the time.

In the end, the figure of the Muslim in the Nazi imagination, whether evoked through popular culture or military thinking, served merely as a tool for the achievement of the racist and imperialist objectives of the regime. Even if Nazi Germany's war was a lost cause from the beginning, Motadel's book still offers several points of interest for scholars of military mobilization, particularly as it relates to religious groups. Although focused on the example of the Second World War, the author invites us to consider the "Muslim world" in more complex, sophisticated, and nuanced ways. This not only makes good sense for matters relating to militaries, but also for political policies now and in the future. While mobilizing Muslims for the German war effort was largely a sideshow in WWII, reaching out to adherents of Islam is and will continue to be a core concern of governments around the globe.

[2] *Carl Peters* (dir. Herbert Selpin, Germany, 1941).

Frode Sandvik and Erik Tonning, eds. *Art in Battle* (Bergen, Norway: KODE Art Museum/ Stuttgart: Ibidem, 2017), pp. 254, ISBN: 978-3838210643.
Stephen Nepa (Temple University)

In July 1937, more than 700 works deemed *Entartete Kunst* ("degenerate art") were displayed at Munich's Great German Art Exhibition to show how Modernism was, in the view of the Third Reich, morally threatening. At its opening, Hitler announced "works of art which cannot be understood in themselves but need some pretentious instruction book to justify their existence will never again find their way to the German people." Specifically, Hitler derided works from the Cubist, Dadaist, Expressionist, and Surrealist schools, pressing for their replacement in museums with the show's Germanic examples to cleanse impurities then tainting the art world.

During its twelve years in power, the Nazi regime appropriated art for propagandist purposes with the Munich exhibition the first of eight such shows organized by its cultural arbiters. As many scholars have demonstrated, they contrasted Aryan art with so-called degenerate art to glorify German identity and strengthen German nationalism.[1] In 1942, the *Art and Non-Art* exhibition opened in Nazi-occupied Bergen, Norway. Curated by German painter and professor Søren Onsager, who was appointed director of Norway's National Gallery the previous year, the show is the focus of *Art in Battle*, a collection of ten essays illuminating how Nazi views surrounding the arts formed a "cultural, political, and ideological bridge" stretching from Munich to Norway (p. 51). Penned by art historians, museum curators, and sociologists, and blending elements of an exhibition catalog and academic treatise, each chapter addresses the relationship between Nordic and Germanic history through prisms of wartime politics and artistic interpretation; as contributor Line Daatland argues, art in this case served as "an important ideological vessel for the combatants." (p. 53)

Attracting more than 20,000 visitors, *Art and Non-Art* ran at Bergen for three weeks between 1942 and 1943, with subsequent shows in Oslo, Trondheim, and Stavanger. The timing now seems rather precipitous, with Operation Barbarossa coming unglued at Stalingrad that winter. If Hitler's battlefield strategies proved fallible, Onsager's curatorial strategies proved compelling. An assemblage of works taken from the National Gallery, the show offered a range of nineteenth-century pastoral landscapes from Gerhard Munthe, J.C. Dahl, Frits Thaulow, and Kitty Kielland juxtaposed with Cubist scenes by Jais Nielsen, Aage Storstein, Johs Rian, and Kai Fjell. The latter "degenerate" works received the most criticism, with Onsager noting that

[1] Jonathan Petropoulos, *The Faustian Bargain: The Art World in Nazi Germany* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000); Richard Etlin, *Art, Culture, and Media under the Third Reich* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Eric Michaud, *The Cult of Art in Nazi Germany* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004); Karen Fiss, *Grand Illusion: The Third Reich, the Paris Exposition, and the Cultural Seduction of France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); and Olaf Peters, ed. *Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany* (Munich: Prestel, 2014).

German culture "has lost by giving access to this kind of art" and Minister of Culture Gulbrand Lunde stating they revealed decadence in Norwegian society (p. 79). Merging with the Reich's racial and political ideologies, contributor Anita Kongssund argues that Onsager cited "French snobbery" and "international Jewish art" as grave threats to morality and that Cubist subject matter glorified Marxism, Bolshevism, and the Modernist embrace of "cripples, freaks, pimps, and whores" (p. 79). Ultimately, she argues *Art and Non-Art* emerged a "litmus test of [the German] nation's moral health" (p. 95).

Examining political aspects of *Art and Non-Art*, Dag Solhjell proposes the idea of the "Führer regime," a top-down model of leadership where representatives from the art world were selected by the government as "intermediate bodies between the state and art" (p. 99). Refreshing this theory from his earlier work, Solhjell identifies Onsager as Hitler's chief instrument regarding artistic propaganda in Norway and the "leading ideologue of the Führer regime" in Norwegian art (p. 104).[2] Yet he maintains that by focusing exclusively on the binary between "degenerate modernists" and "Norwegian national romanticism," scholars have missed how local sympathies and rivalries played out against *Art and Non-Art's* overt messages; as he and other contributors note, few Norwegian artists attended the show, effectively boycotting the Third Reich's censorship.

In a particularly revealing chapter, Christian Fuhrmeister portrays Norway as singular among nations under Nazi occupation. Unlike France, Belgium, or the Netherlands, Norway endured occupation not for political or ideological reasons but for military and strategic necessities. More, Norwegians were considered a superior race and part of a larger Germanic ethnic bloc. In that context, Fuhrmeister posits that the "shades, nuances, and subtleties" of the German-Norwegian relationship warrant increased attention (p. 135). He finds that reactions to Nazi culture (and *Art and Non-Art* in particular) exposed the "reluctance and stubbornness" of the Norwegian character to Reich propaganda; whether via "inner refusal or open boycott," Norway's artists and cultural elite by war's end even disdained the Weimar Classicism they so admired prior to 1940 (p. 125). Conversely, Terje Emberland demonstrates Nazi party members' wartime fascination with Norwegian culture. No official embodied such fascination more than Heinrich Himmler, whose racialized visions fueled the Holocaust and who believed Nordic-Germanic blood was "the bearer of the creative and heroic, the life-sustaining qualities in our people" (p. 139). Emberland notes that even in 2017, the tendency to focus only on "genocidal aspects of [Himmler's] racial ideas" obscures other contributing factors to the SS worldview. In teasing out Himmler's co-opting of Viking relics, folk music, and the rock carvings at Ekeberg as part of a larger Germanic heritage, Emberland cites *Blutsgemeinschaft*, or a supranational racial community imagined by the Nazi minister and transmitted through cultural emissaries such as German poet Hanns Johst and racial theorist Hans F.K. Günther.

[2] Dag Solhjell and Hans Fredrik Dahl, *Honour Above All: Prosecutions Within the Art World After 1945* (Oslo: Pax, 2013).

One of *Art in Battle's* more challenging (and rewarding) chapters addresses an aesthetic current known as *Lebensphilosophie*, or "vitalism." As explained by Eirik Vassenden, the idea's roots lay in Nietzsche and Schopenhauer's critiques of the material and inauthentic but when appropriated in a Germanic-Nordic context during WWII, became "engulfed by the machinery of war" and lost its revolutionary potential (p. 174). Vassenden cites prewar examples of vitalist art by Edvard Munch, Trygve Davidsen, and Fjell, all of which depict sunlight (the genre's most extant motif) and its nurturing effects on the human body. That those works employed naked bodies suggests a celebration of a healthy, athletic, outdoor lifestyle, a trope reflected in several facets of Nazi propaganda. Volume co-editor Erik Tonning addresses the Nazi preoccupation with *Kunst* and *Kampf* (or "art and battle") as seen through selected works by solider-artists produced after the Munich exhibition in 1937. The personal, constant struggle as defined in Hitler's *Mein Kampf* widened via propagandic channels into *Lebenskampf*, or a national battle for existence. Images such as Karl Busch's haunting *Vanguard I with Death* (1941-45) and Rudolf Hengstenberg's solemn *The Soldier after Battle* (1944) confirm what Tonning labels the "apocalyptic underpinnings" of Nazi ideology (p. 179).

Art in Battle succeeds in widening the scope of Nazi cultural policies and their implementation as well as the understudied dialogue crossing between Norwegian and Germanic channels before, during, and to a lesser extent, after WWII. The volume makes exceptionally fine use of images shown not only in the 1937 and 1942 degenerate art exhibitions but also those that place the overlapping of Norway and Germany's art communities into sharper relief. Though lacking a concluding chapter or comprehensive index, each chapter offers closing remarks as well as bibliographies and endnotes. Its release is timely, given the $1 billion recovery of *Raubkunst* ("stolen art") from a Munich flat in 2013 and the Neue Galerie's staging of "Degenerate Art: The Attack on Modern Art in Nazi Germany, 1937" the following year in New York. While not as authoritative as traditional academic works and rather exorbitantly priced, *Art in Battle* will certainly appeal to art historians, diplomatic historians, curatorial specialists, and those interested in lesser-known dimensions of WWII.

Warren K. Wilkins, *Nine Days in May: The Battles of the 4th Infantry Division on the Cambodian Border* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 2017), pp. 432, ISBN: 978-0806157153.

Anne Y. Brinton (University of Maryland University College-Europe)

The Central Highlands of Vietnam are a region of "remote, forested ... hills and mountains" (p. 6) near the Cambodian border. In 1967 they were encompassed within II Corps, the American tactical zone that stretched from Kontum Province southward to Binh Thuan (map on p. 4). In May of that year, elements of the 4th Infantry Division took on battalion-sized units of the North Vietnamese Army in a series of ferocious battles that left 69 Americans and 369 Vietnamese dead (p. 351). When the fighting was over, North Vietnamese plans for a major monsoon-season offensive had been stymied.

These battles were part of a broader struggle for control of the Highlands, which were of critical strategic importance, both for the U.S. forces and for the Communist government in Hanoi. At stake were the American-sponsored counter-insurgency efforts in the more densely populated lowlands. For Hanoi, the Highlands offered a potential staging ground for thrusts to the east towards the coastal plain or south to Saigon, meant to "disrupt vital allied pacification programs" and obtain valuable men and materiel (p. 6). For the Americans, engaging the enemy in their mountain territory constituted "an aggressively forward defense" (p. 122), upon which the success of their lowland strategies depended.

Warren K. Wilkins neatly brackets his densely written narrative history with concise discussions of both North Vietnamese and American strategy in the Highland region. But primarily, *Nine Days in May* is a soldiers' story. Wilkins supplies careful biographical detail for many of his subjects, draftees and career Army personnel alike, and he explores their backgrounds and wartime experiences with sensitivity and skill. His research is meticulous, drawing from, among other sources, the Vietnam Archive at Texas Tech, the holdings of the U.S. Army Center of Military History in Washington, D.C., the National Archives, numerous private collections, and personal interviews with well over one hundred subjects. Wilkins also does not neglect the North Vietnamese forces, offering, where possible, the histories of their combat units and military commanders.

He hints at the social and political unrest back home. Some of his veteran interviewees make passing reference to the ways in which "everything going on in the country with the civil rights movement and race relations" created tension between white soldiers and their African American comrades, who sometimes—but not always—felt that "their fight was back home" (p. 52). A discussion of the unpleasant task of counting enemy dead ("It was just *gross*," one man recalled) in order to allow higher-ups to "measure progress in the war through statistical methods" raises questions about what would become a highly controversial practice (p. 232). And the choice to consult the family members of the slain allows for some pointed critique of how the nation let its Vietnam-era servicemen down. In World War Two, a veteran's sister explains, Hollywood had "tak[en] the country to war with the troops." Back then,

"[f]actories retooled and people sacrificed to help the boys. No one remembered to do that when we sent our boys to Vietnam" (p. 117).

But for the most part, his attention remains firmly fixed on the men in the field. Although many of the men Wilkins profiles had faced combat before, the fighting they confronted in the Central Highlands would prove a new experience—their foes would be well-armed professional soldiers, "not poorly trained guerrillas brandishing outdated weapons" (p. 18). The tactics employed by the North Vietnamese—ambush attacks "supported by mortars and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs)"—were designed to force the Americans to fight at close quarters, where artillery and air strikes would be of limited use (p. 17). They were also hampered, Wilkins finds, by what he terms the "farcical" rules of engagement that prohibited "the use of *offensive* force" across the border of ostensibly neutral Cambodia (p. 125).

Much of the book is as gripping as any novel. The veterans' memories are clear and precise, and in Wilkins' hands their stories are well told. One feels their awe as they watched parachute flares dropped from an AC-47 "illuminate the tenebrous jungle below," throwing weird shadows and "eliciting a whole host of imaginary horrors" (p. 97). One feels their shame when a cohort of journalists—including two women—arrived on the battlefield, cameras in hand, full of well-meaning questions, while the infantrymen had become indecently ragged ("with our crotch ripped out of our pants and stuff like that," as one man put it) through hours and days of hard fighting (p. 230-231). One feels their revulsion at what became of the human body. A young sergeant spotted "what looked like a slab of skin stuck to a tree," complete with a tattoo reading "Born to Lose" (p. 111). A private struggled with the "utterly dehumanizing" job of loading the bodies of slain comrades onto a helicopter, "scoop[ing] brain matter off the ground" to tuck it into the poncho with the body to which it belonged (p. 115). One grieves for the dead. Especially poignant are the fates of Sergeant Bruce Grandstaff, already wounded in both legs, and killed in action three days before the birth of his daughter (p. 75) and Specialist Joe Mancuso, killed by an RPG round with his C-rations and spoon still in his hands (p. 102).

In addition to his valuable exploration of the soldiers' experience in this phase of the Vietnam War, with *Nine Days in May* Wilkins fills a gap in the history of the 4th Infantry, whose service during the world wars is comparatively better known. In terms of the history of the Vietnam War, Wilkins' historiographical intervention is not strongly emphasized, but per Robert J. Thompson, writing for *The Strategy Bridge*, fits neatly within a recent trend which aims to rehabilitate General William Westmoreland and his mastery of counter-insurgency warfare in the pre-Tet period.

Overall, *Nine Days in May* should be of great appeal to scholars of the war as well as to veterans and the casual enthusiast.

Colin McCullough, *Creating Canada's Peacekeeping Past*, Paperback reprint (Vancouver/Toronto: UBC Press, 2017), pp. 272, ISBN: 978-0774832496.

Paolo Andrea Gemelli (University of Genoa, Italy)

Canada was and still is a peacekeeping nation.

It was Canada's then Minister of External Affairs (now Foreign Affairs), Lester B. Pearson, who suggested the actual notion of the UN-led "peacekeeping" force to the special emergency session of the General Assembly on November 2nd, 1956. In his speech to the Assembly, Pearson argued that current proposals did not go far enough in dealing with tensions within the Suez Canal. Instead, Pearson believed that what was needed was "a truly international peace and police force...large enough to keep these borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out."

This peacekeeping force would be deployed to facilitate settlements in order to bring about international peace and security. Moreover, a by-product of this UN intervention would be to allow for the peaceful withdrawal of the British, French and Israeli troops. Pearson's suggestion culminated in the unprecedented formation of the first official armed UN peacekeeping mission with, as its first commanding officer, Canadian General E.L.M. "Tommy" Burns. The sensitive and critical timing of Pearson's proposal was crucial in the approval of the force and gained him the well-deserved recognition of being the 'grandfather of peacekeeping.' Pearson was awarded the 1957 Nobel Peace Prize for his innovative thinking and long-term commitment to peace. He went on to be Canada's 14th Prime Minister. Since 1948 over 750,000 military, police and civilian personnel from some 110 countries have served in these operations; more than 2,298 of them have lost their lives. In 1988, the United Nations forces were the recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize[1].

In his book, Colin McCullough revisits and revises Canada's peacekeeping past to shed light on why and how so many Canadians believed peacekeeping to be a part of the country's national identity, as well as the problem this engendered. Why did so many Canadians embrace peacekeeping as a symbol of their national identity from 1956 to 2005? To answer this question McCullough examines four decades of production and reception of peacekeeping messages. This book illustrates some of the numerous ways that messages about peacekeeping were produced, disseminated and received by Canadians.

Rhetoric has been described as an instrument used by members of a social group to promote a social cohesion. With regards to peacekeeping, the book presents Canada as a nation of *Blue Berets.* To identify oneself with this nation required very little; some people volunteered to join the Canadian Forces and actively participated in the UN peacekeeping; while the majority of Canadians expressed their self-conception as a part of a nation of Blue Berets by

[1] Josephine C. Ofodile, "United Nations and Conflict Management in Africa: A Study of the Darfur Crisis" (MSc Thesis, University of Nigeria Nsukka, 2011), http://www.unn.edu.ng/publications/files/images/OFODILE%20C.JOSEPHINE.pdf.

supporting the United Nations and Canada's peacekeeping efforts by voting for a major political party that endorsed peacekeeping.

Nevertheless, this book is not a mission-by-mission account of the work done by the Canadian Forces on behalf of the United Nations. Such an analysis would reveal a mixed record that speaks to the tremendous challenges inherent in the double project of keeping warring sides apart and then helping in reconstruction after conflicts have run their course. To get to the heart of the Canadian attachment to peacekeeping, it is vital to look beyond the successes or failures of the missions themselves. The adoption of peacekeeping as a national symbol in Canada depended on writers and artists who joined their visions of Canada's past, present and future with the values and possibilities represented by international peacekeeping.

Politicians were not solely responsible for official discussions of peacekeeping. Indeed, individual Canadians also learned about their country's peacekeeping acumen in their homes and classrooms. School classrooms have been perceived as crucial sites where ideas about national identity and self-identity are formed in children, adolescents and teachers. The approved teaching material for those who entered Canadian high schools any time after 1959 often included discussions about peacekeeping and Canada's role in its creation. Until 1997, these discussions in some high school textbooks and other audio-visual materials expanded from about a paragraph to several chapters. Notwithstanding, the amount of history taken in by most students in Canada shrank considerably. While school textbooks did not create the narrative of peacekeeping, they were a powerful means by which a consensus-based narrative of its central events and figures was learned by many Canadians from 1959 to 1997.

But the classroom was not the only site where Canadians, both young and old, learned about peacekeeping. Documentary films were used as in-class teaching tools, as educators of the general Canadian public and to satisfy Canadian broadcasting content standards, which offered a distinct visual characterization of Canada's peacekeeping efforts. The National Film Board of Canada (NFB) made fourteen films between 1957 and 1995 that dealt solely with peacekeeping or had peacekeeping as a major component. Why these films were made, how they were produced, and the messages they presented are explained by McCullough also using files from NFB archives in order to present a fuller picture of the production of four particular films (*The Thin Blue Line,* 1958; *You Are Welcome, Sirs, to Cyprus,* 1964; *Keeping the Elephants Away,* 1986 and *The Price of Duty,* 1995). To identify the differences in how peacekeeping was portrayed in the years from 1957 to 1965 and from 1980 to 1995, McCullough efficiently divided these documentaries into two distinct time ranges.

The English and French newspapers' coverage of peacekeeping operations from 1956 to 1997 highlighted the tense political debate that surrounded the Canadian peacekeeping origin. More than any other media, Canadian newspapers provided the language and imagery that linked peacekeeping to the country's national identity. Being the first to respond to international events permitted articles and editorials to set the framework within peacekeeping that would be discussed in each of the time periods covered in this book. As

McCullough shows, newspapers advanced ideas about peacekeeping being the representation of the best or worst Canadian international action, and encouraged peacekeeping to be framed in domestic terms.

Newspapers offered their readers regular coverage of peacekeeping when Canadians participated in new missions and when the Canadians failed to keep the peace. But theirs were not the only pieces in newspapers that commented on peacekeeping. Editorial cartoons visually examined the strengths and weaknesses of the peacekeeping, and often found it wanting. In contrast to the news coverage discussed above, cartoonists did not shy away from the controversies surrounding the beginning of any peacekeeping operation, or ignore it when things went poorly for a UN operation.

As the author underlines, cartoons must be seen as sites of criticism about peacekeeping in Canada since 1956. Cartoonists were allowed to operate in editorial spaces that could differ from those of writers. By exploring Canada's complicated international role with the UN, these cartoons could encourage critical thinking about peacekeeping as a Canadian activity. The ephemeral nature of editorial cartoons limited their potential impact. Images of peacekeepers as effeminate men and bumbling policemen in 1956 did not dampen Canadians' enthusiasm for this international action. Yet in 1967, 1993, and 1997, when images about peacekeepers reinforced ideas found elsewhere in Canada, cartoonists' criticism were particularly incisive, and offered Canadians alternatives to their identity as a nation of Blue Berets. Despite these brief periods, cartoonists ultimately could not overcome the nostalgic and progressive discourses that operated elsewhere, and encouraged Canadians to see peacekeeping primarily as a part of Canada's national symbology.

Starting from the spring of 1993 when revelations regarding the death of Shidane Arone, Ahmed Arush and Abdi Hunde Bei Sabrie at the hands of members of Canadian Airborne Regiment became public knowledge, to 1997, when the report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry was released, Canada's peacekeeping identity endured the most intense criticism of any point in the previous fifty years. The government of Jean Chrétien could not ignore calls for changes in the military culture of the armed forces and for increased clarity in the operational mandates of future Canadian peacekeeping endeavours. As a consequence of such a political climate change, many Canadians started viewing their country's UN peacekeeping service primarily through nostalgic acts of remembrance.

Hanne Fjelde and Kristine Höglund, eds. *Building Peace, Creating Conflict? Conflictual Dimensions of Local and International Peacebuilding* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press 2011), pp. 192, ISBN: 978-9185509607.

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Although this book was published in 2011, it still holds much value. Any of its chapters, together with more recent scholarship since its publication and related to it, or even because of it, could be included in any anthology on international relations, conflict resolution, security studies, peace studies and related disciplines. The "Forward" establishes the origins of the book as based on the "16-17 December 2010 Swedish National Conference on Peace and Conflict Research" in Uppsala, Sweden, under the sponsorship of the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University.

The chapters cover a wide range of topics in the field of peace studies, more specifically in the area of "peacebuilding". The collection of chapters could easily be read as separate essays in any professional journal, but in the book, they conform a coherent covering of seminal questions and possible areas of inquiry for future research, as well as foundational terms and definitions in this field of studies. On these elements alone, the book is still valuable and recommendable both for the professional practitioner in the field, for the academic and for students.

One can detect that suggestions and open questions for further research originally proposed in this book have been addressed since and have continued to grow and develop in further inquiry. In looking at recent essays, articles and research in journals in the area of "peacebuilding" and related fields, one can find many of the authors in this book and others influenced by it since its publication. In this sense, the book has served and will continue to serve as a possible blue print or road map for further inquiry.

Addressed in this collection of substantive essays is the larger question of how "conflictual dimensions of local" realities in any international effort of an intervening nature contribute to either the real building of peace or to creating new conflicts, to complicate dimensions of conflict or to perpetuate unresolved conflicts.

A central question in this matter, of the task of international "peacebuilding" for example, is the question of "friction." During the actual implementation of peacebuilding plans, in concrete and actual interventions in conflicts in various countries as directed by external organizations, those plans meet local conditions. And just as it is said that military plans for invasions and occupations actually change with the friction of battle and combat, in the case of "peacebuilding" interventions, the question of friction could be addressed conceptually

and practically to analyze and study the actual challenges that peacebuilding plans and interventions face in intervened conflicts or post-conflict situations.

As with the term "friction", one of the valuable aspects of the essays is the many definitions of terms and concepts that have helped both define the field and developed its conceptual framework found throughout the chapters. The definition of "intervention" is particularly useful (chapter 4, "Interveners and Intervened Upon", Gelot & Söderbaum) as well as the careful distinctions between "war", "conflict" and other terms usually misused or improperly applied in popular discourse and even among "experts". These are not terms and concepts purely speculated upon semantically or even metaphysically but on recent and historical empirical research and data both of a quantitative and qualitative nature. "Drawing on research conducted several decades ago, we define intervention as the organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries or borders, by one actor or group of actors, with the goal of affecting the structures of political authority or an identifiable 'problem' in a target society." (p. 74)

Thus, due to the definitive aspects of some of the chapters, in clarifying and establishing terms in this field of study and using historical case studies both quantitative and qualitative, one can see how most of the chapters in this book could be included in any anthology of peace studies, conflict resolution, or international relations in general, according to their specific topics. Perhaps, in that regard, a minor flaw of the book is the lack of a glossary for terms of a technical nature or of organizational abbreviations.

At 181 pages of actual text (including a superb bibliography) the essays are well-organized, starting with a "Forward" written by Henrik Landerholm asking (and predicting), "What kind of research might we see in Swedish, and indeed international, peace research ten years from now? …My prediction is that we will see more studies built on large-scale field studies involving the collection of survey data from individuals."

One essay that later expands on the specific question of "friction" is "Precarious Peacebuilding: Friction in Global-Local Encounters" by Annika Björkdahl & Kristine Höglund can also be found in "Peacebuilding" (1:3, 289-299). Others can be found in various related journals like "Security Studies", "Journal of Peace Research", "Journal of Conflict Resolution", "Peace and Conflict" and many others.

Eight chapters cover and run the gamut from an introductory chapter 1, "Building Peace, Creating Conflict?" (Fjelde & Höglund) which clearly outlines the book and introduces main terms and concepts, starting with the concept of "peace-building" itself, to chapter 8, "Humanitarian Assistance and the Politics of Gender Equality…" (Olivius) addressing conflictive notions of gender between the

expectations of international and local actors. I found this chapter of particular interest and worthy of further reflection on the question of how to balance values and expectations of interveners and respect for local processes and cultures.

In every situation of conflict there is a question of dissatisfaction regarding at least two claims. In the case of the type of conflicts we are considering, as part of international relations (social, political, economic conflicts), these dissatisfactions revolve around the question of justice, more precisely speaking perceived injustices, actual injustices or potential injustices. Throughout the book the matter of justice is addressed indirectly, and also directly in chapter 2 "Just Peace Postponed, Unending Peace Processes and Frozen Conflicts" (Aggestam & Böokdahl) and in chapter 7, "Individual Justice and Collective Innocence" (Mannerggren Selimovic), but also left open for further research and reflection, since the question of justice is quite the part and parcel of claims in the nature of conflicts.

As observer/fact-finder during Nicaragua's civil war of the 1980s, one facet this reviewer could certainly say would need to be considered is how "outside" NGO organizations may contribute to a conflict by *a priori* partnering with local civil society organizations in the country of conflict and whether or not these organizations can contribute effectively to the peace-building process and more specifically to transitions to democracy. This is specially the case where the local civil society organizations have been coopted, or even created, by one side of the conflict, usually the state, and even more so where in the case of a victorious state the state privileges those organizations in future settlements of the conflict or in possible transitions to democracy.

With international actors and organizations been often urged to intervene in situations of conflict the nature of those interventions have developed from merely stopping violence to larger projects of democracy building. Do these efforts actually contribute to peacebuilding, or to unending processes and the freezing and prolongation, and even to the reactivation of conflicts? These questions are also addressed in chapter 2, previously mentioned. But the relationship between peacebuilding as transitions to democracy, and whether or not the former contributes to the latter, is specifically addressed in chapter 3, "Peacekeeping and Transitions to Democracy" (Heldt). The chapter "looks at the empirical record of international peace operations in terms of their impact on post-conflict transitions to democracy" (p. 47) through the examination of various hypotheses and by examining also the assumptions of the "preconditionist" versus the "universalists" schools of thought in democracy-building theory.

If we define peace as the presence of justice, one could propose that the examination of "peace building", both as descriptive (the actual or perceived absence of justice as dissatisfaction conflict) and as

prescriptive (the deontological justification for intervening), as the projects or steps necessary in assessing the satisfaction and presence of justice, could also be assisted by a review of the contributions of philosophers. Professional practitioners of peacebuilding, as is the case with professionals in international relations, may not be aware of deep seated philosophical positions and traditions and how these in turn serve as undercurrents or as "given" in their programs or approaches to the projects involved. This would be a task especially well-suited for further reflection from the views of philosophy in general and political philosophy and ethics more specifically. In chapter 5, "Local Ownership of Peace, Hobbes, Rousseau and International Support for State-Building in Afghanistan" (Olsson & Jarstad) this angle is explored.

If there is a notion we get from this book is the certainty that "peace building", both as an intellectual and an operational concept, needs to be reconsidered from the many facets that such a task faces in the actual field where "the rubber meets the road" so to speak and not just as an intellectual inquiry.

As conflicts will continue to be part of the international arena for the unforeseen future, and with the addition of peacebuilding as prescription not only to conflict solution but for the furtherance of democracy and interventions as part of a right or responsibility to protect by the international community, together with the role of military actions, more and much clearer understandings of the nature of these interventions will continue to be necessary. Even more necessary will be to task of understanding the dynamics between the justifications for interventions and local conditions in areas of intervened conflicts.