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Jessica H. Clark and Brian Turner, eds. *Brill's Companion to Military Defeat in Ancient Mediterranean Society* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 400, ISBN: 978-9004355774.

Lieutenant Colonel Frank X. Weiss (United States Army, Retired)

Brill's Companions, whether in European History, or in Classical Studies, are valuable peer reviewed research companions, that provide the student/scholar with high level, up to date surveys of themes, persons, movements, currents, and events in European History, written by the foremost subject matter specialists in their respective fields of interest.

This particular "Research Companion" is co-edited by Jessica Clark, Assistant Professor at Florida State University's Department of Classics. (Dr. Clark is the author of "Triumph in Defeat: Military Loss and the Roman Republic"¹). Dr. Clark's co-editor is Brian Turner, Associate Professor at Portland State College of Liberal Arts & Sciences. (Dr. Turner is the author of "World Losses and Worldview: Re-Viewing the Roman Funeral Altar at Adamclisi," *American Journal of Philology*²)

For those unfamiliar with Brill's Companions, this reviewer urges a careful and thorough review of each individual chapter's notes, translations, and bibliography, for it is here where the valuable nuggets of historiography and scholarly understanding truly reside.

The Co-Editors' introduction to this volume proceeds from the thesis that:

1. Culture and societal organization are important to any society's participation in War.
 2. War and military defeats and casualties of war may be universal in human history, however, the reactions and responses to them are by no means universal.
 3. The cultural responses to military defeat and how they are communicated, illuminate the resilience of various human societies.
- (p. 5)

The editors conclude their introduction with the observation that success has a thousand parents; but failure is an orphan. "The military powerhouses of the Ancient World developed a range of sophisticated responses to their failures in

¹ Jessica Clark, *Triumph in Defeat: Military Loss and the Roman Republic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

² Brian Turner, "World Losses and Worldview: Re-Viewing the Roman Funeral Altar at Adamclisi," *American Journal of Philology* 134, no. 2 (2013): 277-304.

war, which we, for as long as we claim to follow in their footsteps, neglect to our peril". (p. 18)

Proceeding chapter by chapter, we endeavor to determine how each individual society, within the Mediterranean World handled their military defeats. Clarkson University's Sarah Melville authors the chapter on the Mesopotamian Peoples' (e.g. Sumer, Babylonia and Assyria) responses to collective societal trauma and military failure. "From the third millennium, people understood that defeat was not only the result of divine anger, but more particularly of a god's withdrawal from his people's presence (temple and city)." (p. 32) Losing militarily during this historic period, in this geographic setting, resulted in the sacking of the defeated city-state's temple and removal of its parent deity, known today as god napping. The concept of "king" during this age and place, required victory to exhibit the favor of the gods. Thus it "...drove kings to justify and assign meaning to their actions by discovering the gods' will and securing their approval." (p. 42)

Jeffrey Rop of the University of Minnesota (Duluth) conducts his analysis of the Achaemenid Empire. He notes that the Achaemenid Persians were known for their various military losses: beginning with Cyrus II at Massagetae; through Cambyses' failed attempt to invade Ethiopia; and on to the successive defeats of Darius and Xerxes at Marathon, Salamis, and Platea. "These setbacks did not result in the execution of the generals responsible. Many Persian commanders were appointed to new positions even after participating in significant military defeats" (p. 70) While there clearly existed a formal judicial proceeding to investigate and punish generals that were accused of malfeasance during military operations, nevertheless, Achaemenid kings did not indiscriminately punish or ostracize generals who merely met with military misfortune.

John Hyland of Christopher Newport University examines the fall of the Achaemenid Persian Armies of Darius III and the successive military disasters that befell his troops at Granicus, Issus, and Gaugamela. Hyland follows the fractured Persian armies and their individual soldier escapees, "in the wake of battlefield disasters" (p. 75) "This study examines evidence of Persian soldiers' post battle activities in three stages: the likelihood of combat survival; initial searches for shelter and sustenance; and the challenges of long distance retreat." (p. 75)

Edith Foster of the University of Queensland reveals the purpose and place of the origins of modern historiography in fifth century BCE Athens. She shows how Thucydides threaded a fine line, when he wrote about Athens' defeats in the Peloponnesian War. The Athenians, Foster argues "...tended to blame military defeat on factors such as cowardice of particular troops and

generals, betrayal by allies or traitors, divine hostility, or bad luck.” (p. 99) Thucydides rejected these conventional explanations, offering instead analytical battle accounts, based on an examination of sources and political analysis. “Thucydides’ detailed descriptions of Athens’ military defeats and their aftermath offered Athenians...an analysis of warfare which engages in a continuous struggle against opposing demagogic representations.” (p. 119)

Max Goldman of Denison University provides an intelligent historiography explanation for the Athenian response to their defeat at the Battle of Chaeronea. The famed orator Demosthenes used his rhetorical skills at a funeral oration to transform a defeat into a defining moment for those that had sacrificed and died to keep Athens from being sacked and occupied. (p. 124) “The traditional nature of the funeral oration gave him a means to minimize the defeat and his own role in it. He shifted the focus from the battle itself by focusing on traditional hoplite excellence (*arête*).” (p. 140)

Matthew Trundle of the University of Auckland argues that “Sparta’s reaction to defeat in the sixth and early-fifth century BCE initially made Sparta stronger and defined its place as the most powerful state in the Peloponnese and in Greece.” (p. 144) Paradoxically over the passage of time, the classic Spartan hoplite ideal of standing heroically in the face of sure defeat and overwhelming odds, led to catastrophic defeats in the fourth and third centuries BCE. (p. 144) These defeats led to the overall decimation of the elite Spartan military age population and the ultimate dissolution of that polis. “Defeat for the Spartans played a significant role in Spartan history, identity and ideology.”(p. 159)

Paul Johnstone of The Citadel recounts the Seleucid defeat of Ptolemaic armies at Panium, at the foot of Mount Hermon, during the summer of 200 BCE. While no comprehensive account of the battle survived, it is clear from demographic information and subsequent political effects that the Ptolemaic defeat led to ascendant Seleucid control of Judea, and signaled the decline of the Ptolemaic Kingdom in Egypt. “The Ptolemaic defeat fell hardest on the infantry phalanx.” (p. 162) During the Fifth Syrian War at Panium, the Seleucids were so successful against the characteristic Hellenic phalanx employed by the Ptolemaic army, that it was virtually annihilated. This caused great loss of life among the 25,000 core Macedonian style cleruches (military settlers in Egypt, who comprised the phalanx). As the traditional Ptolemaic phalanx was essential to both Egypt’s military prestige and operational capability, the loss of key defensive personnel created a loss of identity and legitimacy within the overall Hellenic Successor communities of the Mediterranean. “The dislocations forced upon the settler system by the bloodshed at Panium thus mark a watershed in Ptolemaic military institutions and political affairs away from

settled economic and ethnic elite, toward conscription from a multicultural milieu.” (p. 183)

Co-editor Jessica Clark of Florida State University describes the repercussions of defeat during the period of the Roman Republic. “So, the Roman people, defeated by force, have been overcome often, in many battles; never really in war....” (p. 191) The importance of the reportage of defeat in the history of the Roman Republic is illustrated by the fact that ancient Roman writers minimized the importance of Republican era tactical defeats and they intentionally compressed the intervening elapsed time between the tragic tactical loss and subsequent overall strategic victory. Dr. Clark presents two sample cases; in the first case, a young subordinate Roman officer rallies Roman troops in Spain, during the end of the Second Punic War. In the second case, a Roman commander reportedly lost half of his army, during a subsequent revolt in Spain. “Roman writers’ accounts of defeats and their consequences often aimed at something other than straightforward assessment of strategic realities.” (p. 208)

Amy Richlin of University of California, Los Angeles examines the consequences of defeat, from the perspective of Roman Slave Theater. “Comedy itself, with its slave actors and temporary stage, sometimes located in the Forum, constituted a temporary monument, a place for the defeated, who lived in a city alongside the victors.” (p. 221) Many of the themes recounted in the comedies of the period told the stories of those who lost all and were sold into slavery. The memory of such traumas in most cases, were shared by an audience of victors and vanquished alike. According to the customary usage of this period, war captives were sold, and young women were auctioned for sexual use. (p. 223) The butcher’s bill for the Roman Republic’s dominance of the Mediterranean was paid by both victorious and vanquished soldiers and unfortunate captive civilians. The art of the period imitated life in the expression of their regret, joy, envy and anger. “Alexander made a new iconography of victory, but he also made a world full of slaves; in the 200s (BCE), it can never have been clear that Rome would not be the next city to be sacked, among so many.

Ida Ostenberg of the University of Gothenberg explores the stories that ancient authors tell of Roman defeats and the role played by difficult terrain, unbridged rivers, in combination with unfavorable weather. “As we shall see, Greek and Roman authors often describe the Roman troops as trapped in the wild forests, stuck in rainy marshes, or left on a plain with the wind, dust, and sun in their eyes, all of which contributed to military setbacks.” (p. 240) Ostenberg uses samples of the ancient explanations for the Roman defeats at Caudine Forks, Teutoburg Forest and Lake Trasimene as examples of blaming

nature itself for military defeats. Roman troops were either “trapped in a gorge, pass, or narrow area where they were ambushed by enemies who blocked their way on all sides.” (p. 244) The ultimate progress of Roman forces were often found to be blocked by rivers, lakes, and seas. “As Rome expanded, Nature itself resisted, to such a degree, that it took part in fighting and defeating Rome.” (p. 259)

Co-editor Brian Turner of Portland State University examines “...the reported conduct and comportment of the Julio-Claudian emperors [Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Claudius, and Nero] at these traumatic moments to illuminate the varied expectations emperors, contemporary critics, and later writers had in the aftermath of military failures.” (p. 262) Turner’s study reveals the competing cultural expectations about how an emperor and his subordinates should act in the wake of a catastrophic military disaster. (p. 263) In the end, the overall cultural expectation was that the emperor was ultimately responsible for defending the Roman Empire and it is clear, that some Julio-Claudian emperors succeeded in this expectation, while some obviously did not.

Graeme Ward of Queens University recounts how individual Roman legions within the Principate, developed their own specific unit identity, name, and honorific title. “As Augustus transformed the Roman military of the late Republic from conscripted armies to a standing, professional force, under his own authority, the legions acquired specific designations, including insignia, numbers, and honorific titles.” (p. 234) The legions were emblematic of the power and prestige of the Roman Emperor. Should they meet with a costly defeat by foreign enemies, or any disgrace, e.g. if they were supportive of the emperor’s rivals in some civil revolt or strife – there were severe consequences. “Individual legions that suffered catastrophic losses in war were often not reinforced or reconstituted- rather they could become extinct. Others were disbanded, where they were stripped of their standards and title, and their soldiers redistributed among other legions.” (p. 285) In the last analysis, each Roman emperor of the Principate determined what actually constituted legionary disgrace, defeat, or loss, and made that decision according to his own operational objectives, political goals, and desired military outcomes.

Sviatoslav Dmitriev of Ball State University asserts that “[n]o attention has been paid to the use of the rhetoric of defeat in the later centuries ... including the Roman period, when Greek intellectuals ... referred to famous battles from the glorious past of pre-Roman Greece, furnishing them with elaborate interpretations that catered to the tastes of their urbane audiences, who were versed in mythology, Greek history and literature.” (p. 310) Rhetorical exercises, replete with actual historical figures such as the famed orator Demades and King Philip II of Macedon, were authored by Diodorus

Siculus; Sextus Empiricus; and Ionnes Strobæus. The fact that these stories about Demades' address to Philip did not emerge until the Roman period and that they each assumed different forms suggest that this alleged historical address is not accurate history at all, but a rhetorical exercise. (p. 312) The Roman senator and famed orator Cicero once opined that rhetoricians were permitted by their profession, to lie about history on their way to construct a superior means of expression. "Each of the surviving versions of Demades' words to Philip after Athens' defeat at Chaeronea elicits a complex interpretation as a nuanced rhetorical response from the Roman period to a military loss in classical times." (pp. 327-8)

Craig H. Caldwell III of Appalachian State University concludes this scholarly compilation with a study of the capture of the Roman emperor Valerian, at the hands of Shapur's Sassanid Persians in 260 AD. "So when the reigning emperor lost his freedom to a foreign adversary in 260, the magnitude of his failure dwarfed all others in Roman imperial memory, which already included a host of emperors slain in foreign and civil wars during the third century." (p. 335) Over the ages, there have been numerous historian's reconstructions of the capture of Emperor Valerian, and his ultimate fate at his captor's hands. Naturally, the victorious Persians saw it that way; the contemporaneous defeated Romans saw it another way; and the subsequent Christianized Romans (who suffered persecution at Valerian's hands) interpreted the event in yet another way. "The Roman emperor Constantine used the example of Valerian as a sign of the supreme authority of God, who operated like an earthly sovereign to punish wicked Romans and to threaten proud Persians, stripping them of the glory of capturing a Roman emperor." (p. 353)

Nathan Rosenstein of Ohio State University, (whose seminal scholarly research suggested this overall pathway of study), in his epilogue reviews the fifteen compiled studies and suggests further future opportunities and pathways to discovery. "There is no shortage of themes and subjects through which to explore the experience of military defeat in the ancient world." (p. 371) The companion offers a broad variety of topics that have been very well analyzed and it can therefore not only be used as a kind of handbook of Ancient military defeat, but also in classes in Ancient Military History.

Jenny Benham, *Peacemaking in the Middle Ages: Principles and Practice* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017), pp. 250, ISBN: 978-1526116680.

James Okolie-Osemene (Wellspring University, Nigeria)

This book aims at filling the knowledge gap on the art of peacemaking in the medieval period. It underscores the dearth of studies on peacemaking in comparison to the literature on war with focus on the Middle Ages. This work achieved the goal of filling the knowledge gap in Medieval Europe studies as far as the dynamics of war and peace. The book demonstrated that peace successfully discouraged war which, according to Isaac O. Albert, “is not an event but a process, and people become part of it by learning the process.”¹

The first chapter focuses on the meetings between rulers of equal standing, and how the locations where they met were significant. For example, despite the superiority of French kings in theory, French kings and the Norman dukes often met under an elm tree near their borders in recognition of the *de facto* power of the dukes as they were also kings of England. The elm tree between Gisors and Trie was instrumental to the meetings between French kings and Norman dukes from 1167 to 1188, before anger and frustration of Philip Augustus made him to cut it down in 1188. It is important to note that Medieval princes defined themselves “in charters and treaties by the people they rule rather than rulers of territories” (p. 24). This reveals the significance of the people in a territory. In this regard, while Philip Augustus was the King of the French, Henry II was the King of the English as well as the Duke of the Normans. Unlike most Medieval rulers, Henry II, in 1154, assumed “multiple capacity as King of the English, Duke of the Normans and the Aquitanians, and Count of the Angevins.” (p. 28)

The author also endeavored to capture the significance of geography to peacemaking in Medieval Europe. Her choice of words and use of maps to showcase Anglo-French peace conferences during the reign of some kings is relevant to scholars of geography, history and peace studies. A notable feature of the meeting places was that dukes of Normandy and French kings met more than four times in all parleys from 1181 to 1200. The maps for the location of peace conferences captured the meetings held up to 1216. The author also acknowledges the role of frontier studies scholars in categorizing borders as zones rather than lines. The author’s conception of border refers to “a specific

¹ Isaac O. Albert, “Making Education a Force for Sustainable Peace and Development,” 25th-29th Combined Convocation Lecture, November 7, Port Harcourt: Ignatius Ajuru University of Education, 2012, 18.

place where rulers met,” rather than the contemporary use of the term in terms of “a line” (p. 31). At borders none of the parties involved controlled such locations especially if they are rulers of people. This made it easier for alteration of borders to be resolved with treaties. Thus, meeting as equals mattered to rulers. The author reveals that “each chosen location prevented the rulers from being regarded as victor or vanquished” (p. 34). It is noteworthy that trees, bridges and rivers were landmark sites where medieval rulers made peace. Envoys were active stakeholders in peacemaking. A remarkable lethal incident was reported to have occurred in the fifteenth century on the Montereau Bridge, where John the Fearless, Duke of Burgundy was killed and his hand cut off. The visible attribute of the settings had witness value as meetings were held in open-air locations for people to observe.

Chapter Two discusses the meetings between superiors and inferiors. Meetings between different categories of rulers in terms of position or status as kings was commonplace. For example, a visit of English kings to Welsh rulers portrayed the superiority of the former, as they had access to their opponent’s territory. The inverse could also be true. The journey of Scottish kings into England was designed by the English to portray the former as inferior. The Anglo-Scottish conference of 1200 was significant because of its visibility and location outside the city of Lincoln. Thereafter, the Anglo-Scottish conferences were held within the English territory. The kings were not meeting as equals..

In the third chapter, on the rituals of peacemaking, the author makes it clear that meetings between rulers were characterized by the obligations to give, receive, and repay gifts when necessary. These principles guided the practice of peacemaking, with the giver having the advantage. Notable items given as gifts included swords, rings, gold, silver, horses and silk, with the ring and the sword symbolized royal authority. Giving of gifts mattered in Medieval Europe, where spectators assumed the role of witnesses. The fact that the ring showed also showed a sign of mutual affection demonstrated the relevance of rings in sustaining intergroup relations. Rituals made actions more critical than the spoken word, thereby setting a pattern of behavior.

Chapter Four focuses on the relevance of homage, fealty and gestures of submission. In the Middle Ages, homage, fealty (faith) and gestures of submission were characteristics of peacemaking. Homage and fealty involved acts like stating the willingness to become the king’s man, the placing of joined hands between the hands of the count, swearing of an oath, and investiture. Kings paid homage as equals and inferiors. Although the English king did not owe allegiance to the French king, he did as the Duke of Normandy and Aquitaine, and as the Count of Anjou. Homage and fealty were basically acts of subordination; the circumstances surrounding them were manipulated to fit the

wishes of the participants. This means that the participants engaged in the practice of homage to achieve their interests.

In the fifth chapter, which is on the envoys and negotiators of peace, the author emphasizes that the mediaeval peacemaking process was also facilitated by the involvement of envoys and mediators who negotiated on behalf of their kings. These representatives were called *procurator* and *nuncius*, who had letters of credence empowering them to deliver agreements. Some of them, like Walter of Coutances, negotiated for England in 1190. Negotiators included Denmark, England, Germany, France and Scotland. Chancellors and vice-chancellors also played significant roles in diplomacy, which facilitated peacemaking. The use of high-ranking envoys was to the advantage of the kings they represented. Apart from high status, trust and experience guided the choice of envoys.

Chapter Six discusses how oaths guaranteed peace by sustaining agreements in Medieval Europe. Oath-taking was a force of order which enabled followers and rulers to voluntarily agree and confirm collective actions aimed at restoring peace. One of the notable oaths is the Anglo-Sicilian oath of 1190 because of the strategic context and safety guarantees for Tancred by Richard against any aggressor.

Chapter Seven identifies how hostages and sureties were instrumental to peacemaking, as kings kept hostages to ensure the future good behavior of their rivals. With this, political submission was guaranteed because hostages became guarantors of agreements. The author notes that the use of hostages to secure the release of adversaries became a negotiation strategy, as adopted by England when the Scottish king was captured in 1174. Groups given as hostages by rulers included heirs, loyalists, sons, and women. Remarkably, defeat was not the only propellant for hostages, but also a voluntary and conscious act aimed at sustaining peaceful relations. Apart from hostages, kings needed sureties to conclude treaties, and such people would have their liberty deprived if there was a breach of the agreement. Sureties were used between England and Scotland (1174), and between England and France (1191). In some instances, “sureties swore to hand themselves over if an agreement was broken” (p. 169). By implication, oaths and sureties were intended to serve as deterrents.

In Chapter Eight, which focuses on treaties, terminology and the written word, the author identifies the archival problem that threatens the survival of treaties during this period. Challenges of archiving treaties notwithstanding, many kings endeavored to take care of documents containing treaties to prevent damage. The author classifies treaties into peace treaties, treaties of alliance, contracts of marriage, and treaties of limited truce. The terminologies used in explaining agreements varied because they determined period, geography,

language and narrative sources on the role played by rulers during war and peacemaking. Principles like the meeting places, the use of envoys, the ceremonies, the guarantees, and the treaties all determined the success of peacemaking in Medieval Europe.

Jenny Benham's book has succeeded in debunking a lot of myths in peace research and contemporary peace processes. The author achieved this through a depth of archival research. This methodological milestone remains a model for peace researchers across the world. The book promotes interdisciplinary research between history studies and peace and conflict resolution. Peace scholars and border studies experts cannot claim to establish gaps in knowledge without consulting this book, which responds to various questions raised by the role of actors and outcome of peace processes. The book is rich with relevant sources, and will certainly propel scholars to initiate more studies on peacemaking in the Middle Ages; in Europe and beyond, especially those involving empires in Africa and Latin America. The argument this review presents is that peacemaking in Medieval Europe was not only kings' affairs, but also people-centered and participatory, as demonstrated by the author with regard to the analyzed case studies.

Georgios Theotokis and Aysel Yildiz, eds. *A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea: Aspects of War, Diplomacy and Military Elites* (Leiden: Brill, 2018), pp. 492, ISBN: 978-9004362048.

Gilmar Visoni-Alonzo (Queensborough Community College, CUNY)

A Military History of the Mediterranean Sea: Aspects of War, Diplomacy and Military Elites, edited by Georgios Theotokis and Aysel Yildiz, is an eclectic collection of essays covering a wide scope of military subjects in the history of the Mediterranean from the early Middle Ages to the Early Modern period. The overarching title is somewhat misleading, or one might say over-ambitious, given the limited chronological scope the articles (sixth century to the eighteenth century), the geographical emphasis on the Eastern Mediterranean, and every article's focus on the Byzantine Empire, the Ottomans, or Venice. The collection deals with a wide range of subjects, from naval organization, deployment and operations (Tilemachos C. Lounghis' "The Byzantine War Navy and the West, Fifth to Twelfth Centuries," Elina Gugliuzzo's "Sea Power and the Ottomans in the Early Modern Mediterranean," and Lilia Campana's "The Defence of the Venetian *Dominio Da Mar* in the Sixteenth Century: Ship Design, Naval Architecture, and the Naval Career of Vettor Fausto's *Quinquereme*") to weapons systems (Georgios Theotakis' "Σπῆρος: An Unusual Byzantine Weapon"), from issues of strategy and command (Cornel Bontea's "The Theory of *Passajum Particulare*: A Commercial Blockade of the Mediterranean in the Early Fourteenth Century?" and Ian Wilson's "By the Sword or by an Oath: Siege Warfare in the Latin East 1097-1131") to military literature (Nikolaos Kanellopoulos' "The Byzantine Influence on the Military Writings of Theodore I Palaiologos, Marquis of Montferrat) and social aspects of military organization (Aysel Yildiz' "Commanders of the Janissary Army: The Janissary Agas, Their Career and Their Promotion Patterns"). While the volume lacks a discernible and overarching theoretical or methodological approach to the study of war and warfare, it does provide a very comprehensive view of the complexity of military endeavors in the Eastern Mediterranean during the period in question.

Tilemachos Lounghis' article, "The Byzantine War Navy and the West, Fifth to Twelfth Centuries," traces the development of the Byzantine navy from the time of the Vandal challenge to the sack of Constantinople by the Crusaders in 1204. Lounghis looks at the history of Byzantine naval endeavors (and their successes and failures) in terms of operational organization and assignment of command at crucial points during Byzantine history. After the collapse of a central fleet under the Arab onslaught of the seventh and eighth centuries, the Byzantines had to rely on naval commands organized on local *thematic* level.

Under this scheme, the naval defense of the empire came to depend, with variable degree of success, upon the Kibyrrhaeotae and Sicilian fleets. This approach to naval defense came to an end when Alexius Comnenus attempted to centralize command and create an imperial fleet with greater operational reach. Given the numbers of vessels and the scale and range of some of the military operations launched in the twelfth century, the centralization seems to have attained a certain level of success. However, a series of failed expeditions, due to both military and meteorological circumstances, brought the attempt at a naval revival to an end.

Elina Gugliuzzo also takes a wide approach in her study of Ottoman sea power in the Early Modern period. It is unclear what the objectives of Gugliuzzo's essay are. She initially claims that Mediterranean studies have "succumbed to a version of Orientalism," but she fails to provide specific examples. Then she goes on to reference spies as "informal intermediaries" and ransomed prisoners as examples of cooperation between Western and Ottoman elites. The body of her essay gives a cursory description of the rise of Ottoman naval power and a brief reference to "Western Seafare." The general "conclusions" seem to be simply generalizations that are only tangentially related to the rest of the essay.

One of the more "successful" chapters in the collection is Raffaele D'Amato's "A Sixth or Early Seventh Century AD Iconography of Roman Military Equipment in Egypt: Deir Abou Hennis Frescoes." In this piece the author looks at the artistic representations of warriors in the religious frescoes of a late-antiquity Coptic church and uses them to produce a more detailed view of the equipment of Byzantine soldiers during the late antiquity/early medieval period. According to the author, information on the weapons and uniforms of the Byzantine army in the period immediately prior to the Arab conquests is limited to some literary descriptions, artistic representations and scant archaeological evidence. The frescoes depict the biblical "Killing of the Innocents," with King Herod surrounded by guards and soldiers in the act of executing the innocent babies. Even though the frescoes are badly damaged, D'Amato aptly describes elements of the uniforms and panoply while comparing them to similar representations found in Byzantine settings at Ravenna and other parts of North Africa. The author is also successful in comparing the iconographic representations to information found in literary sources. The result is a valuable addition to our knowledge of the military panoply of Byzantine forces during a period where not much information exists.

In the same vein as D'Amato's chapter, but less significant in its conclusions, is Jason-Elfeherios Tzouriadis' "Post-Byzantine Art and Western Influences in Military Iconography: The Case of Staff Weapons in the Work of

Michael Damaskenos.” In this chapter, Tzouradis looks at the opposite end of Byzantine history and uses the work of a famous painter of the Cretan school to analyze the weapons used in the Christian East at the turn of the Early Modern period. Works like those of Tzouradis and D’Amato are important because they contribute with solid and graphic evidence to our knowledge of Byzantine military equipment.

Another solid contribution to the volume is Phillip Rance’s “Late Byzantine Elites and Military Literature: Authors, Readers and Manuscripts (c. 1050-c. 1450).” The Byzantine Empire represents an essential link between the contributions of the Ancient Romans to military theory and practice and the revival of military literature during the Renaissance in the West. While the period between the sixth and the tenth centuries (culminating in the publication of Nikeporos Ouranos’ compendium *Taktika*) represents the core of the Byzantine contribution to military literature, Rance points out that after this Golden Age, and throughout of the long political and military decline of Byzantium, there was a vast and continuous production of military treatises. Rance’s essay not only presents a general description of the most important contributions to the genre during the period in question but also attempts to identify the audience of these works. This essay represents a good point of departure for further research into the genre and its possible influence beyond the Byzantine confines.

As it is usually the case with most compendia of this kind, the present collection lacks a theoretical formulation or conceptual direction (other than the military theme set in a specific geographic context). Some essays are very focused and others are quite general, and the quality of the work is uneven. However, this is the very virtue of such works. The book provides a window into a topic that should be central to the study of war and warfare, but is often relegated to the periphery of the historical discussion by more Western European oriented scholars. Theotokis and Yildiz’s volume adds several pieces that contribute to a more discernable image of the vast and vastly incomplete mosaic that is the contribution of the eastern Mediterranean civilization to military development.

Oswald Überegger, ed. *Minderheiten-Soldaten: Ethnizität und Identität in den Armeen des Ersten Weltkriegs* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2018), pp. 211, ISBN: 978-3506785992.

Lukas Grawe (Bremen University, Germany)

Diversity and multi-ethnicity in armed forces are issues that have been addressed in historical research on several occasions – whether in studies of the composition of the armies of ancient Rome, or in essays on the US Army during the Cold War.¹ For a long time, however, minorities in the armies of the First World War have been rarely examined. It was not until the centenary in 2014 that this subject received more attention,² although the new publications often lacked a comparative perspective. Filling this gap is the aim of the anthology edited by Oswald Überegger, which emerged from a conference with the same title at the Free University of Bolzano in 2015.

The volume includes, in addition to a summary by the Italian historian Nicola Labanca, eight case studies of “regionally rooted national groups from different states whose minority status had been articulated or intensified during the nation-building processes in the 19th century”. (p. 12) The essays are based on a broader definition of minorities which goes beyond “purely linguistic, national, ethnic or religious patterns and reaches deep into the sphere of social and cultural group formation intrinsic to war.” (p. 13)

The essays address three sets of issues: soldiers’ experiences of war, national identities, and the culture of remembrance. The first set of issues deals with the treatment and stereotyping of soldiers by officers and military elites. The aim of the essays is to identify differences and similarities in the military or governmental handling of minorities within the armies as well as similarities and differences with regard to these minorities’ concrete experiences of war. The second – and most interesting – issue is the question of the importance of

¹ See for example Ian Haynes, *Blood of the Provinces: The Roman Auxilia and the Making of Provincial Society from Augustus to the Severans* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), Douglas Walter Bristol and Heather Marie Stur, eds. *Integrating the US Military: Race, Gender, and Sexual Orientation Since World War II* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2017), and Derek Miller, *Minority Soldiers Fighting in the Korean War* (New York: Cavendish, 2018).

² See for example Hannah Ewence and Tim Grady, eds. *Minorities and the First World War: From War to Peace* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), Arthur E. Barbeau, Florette Henri and Bernard C. Nalty, *The Unknown Soldiers: African-American Troops in WWI* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1974) and Jens Boysen, *Preußische Armee und polnische Minderheit: Royalistische Streitkräfte im Kontext der Nationalitätenfrage des 19. Jahrhunderts (1815–1914)* (Marburg/Lahn: Herder-Institut, 2008).

national identities. “How strong were national identities versus regional ones?” asks Oswald Überegger in the volume’s introduction. “Are national identification patterns something ... whose significance has been overestimated in historiography so far?” (pp. 14-15). Another key question is whether national identities played a role in desertions by minority soldiers, or whether this was a consequence of the circumstances of war. The last set of questions deals with the culture of remembrance as it pertains to the topic of minority soldiers. As the editor himself emphasizes, this issue plays only a subordinate role, which is a pity from this reviewer’s point of view.

The individual essays are dedicated to the most important belligerent powers – with the exception of France – and their minority soldiers. In his case study, Richard Lein (Budapest) focuses on the Czech soldiers in the Austro-Hungarian k.u.k. Army. His insights show not only that most of the Czechs remained loyal, but also that after the war the Czech government made great efforts to convert this loyalty into a forced obedience. Austrian historiography, on the other hand, has emphasized the supposedly high desertion rates of Czech soldiers.

Subsequently, Andrea di Michele (Bolzano) considers another minority within the Austro-Hungarian army, namely the Italian-speaking soldiers. Based on numerous letters from Italian-speaking prisoners of war in Russian prison camps, he convincingly demonstrates that to these soldiers national affiliation played a minor role only, while regional identities were far more important.

Jens Boysen (Chemnitz) examines Poles and Danes, two minorities serving in the German Army. In doing so, he begins by discussing German-Danish relations and the German Poland policy, subsequently analyzing the behavior of minorities during the war. Finally, Boysen states that Polish and Danish soldiers were loyal to the German Army and only a few deserted.

In his essay on Alsatian and Lorraine soldiers in the German Army, Volker Prott (Birmingham) not only shows the adaptation strategies of the minority soldiers, but also highlights the repressive measures taken by German politicians, and their counterproductive effects. Prott succeeds in convincing the reader that the German Reich lost the war not only militarily but also politically, as it could offer no political alternatives.

Christoph Jahr (Berlin) examines the role of the Irish in the British Army. Although the bulk of minority soldiers remained loyal, even during the Easter Rising in 1916, the British Army responded even to slight contraventions by meting out harsh military justice. Jahr vividly describes the complex relations between Ireland and England, which ultimately also led to a split memory of war among the Irish soldiers.

The numerous minorities in the Russian Army are analyzed by Reinhard Nachtigal (Freiburg) in his chapter. These include Jews and Muslims as well as Ukrainians, Poles, Latvians, Estonians, Germans, Georgians, and Armenians. Nachtigal states that the Tsarist Army did not discriminate minorities and that it was rather the social challenges that drove the country into revolution in 1917.

Daniel Marc Segesser (Bern) points out the differences in remembrance in his case study about Australian, New Zealand, and Indian soldiers. While the First World War fueled Australian and New Zealand national consciousness, the conflict had much less of an identity-building effect in India as the country at that time was broken up into numerous small states.

Finally, Gerald Lamprecht (Graz) focuses on the Jews, a minority which served in all the armies involved in the war. Regarding the widespread topos of the “Jewish Civil War,” Lamprecht counters that there was a pronounced Jewish patriotism on all sides of the fronts that challenges this limited supranational perspective.

In his conclusion, Nicola Labanca sums up the results of the case studies and points out that sensitivity to minority issues in the armed forces has been slow to develop and that the First World War can be regarded as a starting point. Although repression often had incisive effects, the war also acted as catalyst for integration.

If one summarizes the results of the case studies, it is noticeable that all the warring powers treated their minority soldiers similarly. The political and military leaders distrusted their minorities and doubted their loyalty. Thus, most of the powers resorted to repressive measures and instruments of control. The case studies show, however, that these measures proved counterproductive. Finally, most minority soldiers adhered to a “minimum loyalty” strategy (Boysen): “Members of ethnic and national minorities generally did not go to war in a patriotic and enthusiastic manner, but they behaved more or less correctly and fulfilled their civic duties altogether quite without hesitation.” (p. 17) Finally, the anthology also indicates that the bulk of minority soldiers came from rural and illiterate classes, and therefore were hardly nationalized, while regional identities were much more important. Only the repressive measures by the authorities finally provoked a “secondary nationalization intrinsic to war.” (p. 18) The persistent image of unreliable minority soldiers thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The most significant differences in dealing with minority soldiers were evident after the First World War: In the German-speaking parts of Austria, the minorities served as justification for military defeats, while the soldiers who deserted from the k.u.k. Army were idolized in the successor states of the Danube Monarchy as heroes and founding fathers. Other minority soldiers who

remained loyal were often stigmatized or simply banished from memory. Unfortunately, the essays' analyses of the culture of remembrance are rather brief. The lack of an essay on the minorities in the French Army is an unfortunate shortcoming. The North African colonial soldiers would be especially worth studying. However, this does not detract from the overall positive impression. The case studies consistently address and answer the questions raised in the introduction. Therefore, the anthology is an important compendium that provides solid foundational knowledge on the topic of minority soldiers in the armies of the First World War.

Hans-Christian Harten, *Die weltanschauliche Schulung der Polizei im Nationalsozialismus* (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2018), pp. 663, ISBN: 978-3506788368.

Nathaniel P. Weston (Seattle Central College)

This book is an offshoot of *Himmler's Teachers*, an earlier study of the ideological training of the SS, the Nazi paramilitary organization primarily responsible for the planning and implementation of the genocide of some six million European Jews.¹ Following a similar line of inquiry, the present work examines the indoctrination of the police with National Socialist ideals—like the SS, the police also played a major role in carrying out the Holocaust.

Addressing this topic revisits a now-classic debate in German historiography over the centrality of anti-Semitism in perpetrators' motivations for committing mass murder. Using the same source materials from Reserve Police Battalion 101, Christopher Browning argued that the hatred of Jews worked in coordination with several other situational factors, whereas Daniel J. Goldhagen claimed that an "eliminationist anti-Semitism" was indeed the chief motivator.² Ultimately, Browning's stance has proved more convincing to scholars, though Goldhagen's view was enormously attractive to the general public in Germany when his book first appeared.³ Harten observes that both authors ignore the question of the ideological training of the police and hence his study offers a new approach to the factors contributing to the actions of these Holocaust perpetrators.

The book is divided into three parts. The first surveys the indoctrination of the Sipo and the SD. After 1936, the Sipo controlled the Gestapo—the secret state police—and the Kripo—the criminal investigation police. The SD was the intelligence agency of the SS. In 1939, both the Sipo and the SD fell under the administration of the RSHA, the Reich Main Security Office, demonstrating a series of steps in reorganizing and consolidating police agencies in Nazi Germany. The second section looks at the ideological training of the Orpo, the regular police, founded in 1936, paralleling the formation of

¹ Hans-Christian Harten, *Himmlers Lehrer: Die weltanschauliche Schulung in der SS 1933-1945* (Paderborn: Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, 2014).

² Christopher R. Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Collins, 1992); Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage Books, 1997).

³ See, for example, Norman G. Finkelstein and Ruth Bettina Birn, *A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth* (New York: Holt, 1998); Geoff Eley, ed., *The "Goldhagen Effect": History, Memory, Nazism—Facing the German Past* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000).

the Sipo. The Orpo were subsequently militarized in 1939, shortly after the German invasion of Poland. The third section of the book deals with police indoctrination during the Second World War in the annexed and occupied territories. It examines the ideological education of ethnic Germans in countries outside of Germany as well as Poles, Ukrainians, and Latvians, who became police. It also reviews indoctrination during the war against the Soviet Union and the extermination of the Jews.

The author makes a compelling case that Nazi ideology motivated members of the German police to participate in mass killings of Jewish men, women, and children during World War II. Harten shows that ideological training began in the first year following Hitler's appointment as German Chancellor and continued late into the war. He lists the topics of study at numerous points in the book, dealing with subjects such as race, the law, Hitler's leadership, population policy, German history, and various National Socialist policies. Members of Nazi police organizations viewed propaganda and dramatic films, including the strongly anti-Semitic *The Eternal Jew* (1940) and the story of the Prussian absolutist monarch, Frederick II, *The Great King* (1942), for example, and the regular police were required to study Hitler's *Mein Kampf*—by the end of 1935, Harten points out, some 75% of police officials in Prussia, the largest state in Germany, and 90% of the police overall, owned the dictator's political manifesto (p. 170).⁴

The Ideological Training of the Police under National Socialism provides exhaustive evidence of the ubiquity of the indoctrination of police organizations in Nazi Germany. Surprisingly, however, anti-Semitic subject matter did not always play the central role one might expect. It was often merely one area of study among several others. The war eventually hampered the ability to continue intense ideological training as military survival superseded it. It is remarkable nonetheless that so much effort was devoted to indoctrinating the police in Nazi Germany throughout the existence of the regime, from the consolidation of power to nearly the end of the Second World War as well as during the genocide of European Jews. Picturing Holocaust perpetrators being schooled at the same time they committed mass killings is strange, to say the least, but as Harten illustrates, the ideological training provided a foundation for the police to make sense of their actions in a formal communal setting as part of a larger national, racial, and historical mission.

The author's grasp of biographical details of individual police officials stands as one of the most intriguing and effective aspects of the book. These sections give particular men's backgrounds prior to Hitler's appointment as

⁴*Der ewige Jude* (dir. Fritz Hippler, 1940); *Der große König* (dir. Veit Harlan, 1942).

German Chancellor in 1933 as well as their work while the dictatorship centralized power and instigated the war. Readers see that the police trainers consisted of historians with Ph.D.s, school teachers, and theologians, for example, and their biographies regularly relate “ordinary” stories. For instance, Hans Trummler fought in the First World War, served in a Freikorps unit afterward, became a banking apprentice, and worked in his father’s business, but was forced to declare bankruptcy in 1933. He had joined the Nazi Party and its militia, the SA, in 1928. After the war, a different official managed to become a professor of history at the Heidelberg University of Education and another lived under a false name and worked as a school teacher. Two others who had committed murders during the war were found decades later: one was sentenced to life in 1999, the other sentenced to seven years in 2002. These perspectives remind us that history is made by individuals and that perpetrators continued to be a haunting, if only partially visible, presence in postwar German society.

The book also furnishes striking information about the ideological training of the police in the context of the Holocaust. At one point, a massacre of Jews took place on the grounds of a training school; at another, builders used materials from local Jewish cemeteries; and finally, we learn that Jewish children from Auschwitz were used for target practice at a school, to cite some glaring particulars. Another episode involved the liquidation of a home for disabled children. The book also described a group of disabled Jews taken to Auschwitz. Harten is committed to exposing the crimes of the German police as much as he is to showing how much ideological training they received. Accordingly, he recounts numerous mass killings with statistics indicating the numbers of victims.

This study is most suited to specialists whose interest resides with military indoctrination in Nazi Germany. A work forthcoming next year examines the same question in the context of the German military itself, focusing specifically on the ways it led to the widespread commissioning of war crimes.⁵ We must remember that not only were the German police militarized, but that the murder of European Jews was part of the Nazi ideological view of the war generally. Hence, the “war against the Jews,” as Lucy Dawidowicz entitled her book on the Holocaust, is an important aspect of viewing World War II from the Nazi perspective.⁶ Necessarily, the question of motivation will

⁵ Bryce Sait, *Indoctrination of the Wehrmacht: Nazi Ideology and the War Crimes of the German Military* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2019).

⁶ Lucy Dawidowicz, *The War against the Jews 1933-1945* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1975).

continue to be debated as will the role played by ideology. These factors operate in every military conflict and are often challenging for scholars to pinpoint with precision. Rather than imagining this challenge as a deterrent, it is more useful to conceive of it as an opportunity to better comprehend the course of wars, whether on traditional battlefields, civilian populations, or in other arenas altogether.

Harten's book is essential reading for scholars of perpetrator studies. It moves us closer to understanding the role of anti-Semitism in carrying out the Holocaust. As part of a wider and on-going project to infuse members of German police organizations with Nazi ideals, the mass killing of Jewish people was normalized and legitimized to a great extent by the near-continuous ideological training, the author demonstrates. Because Harten so extensively establishes that schooling Nazi police officials created a cohesive culture before and during the Second World War, it is impossible to claim that indoctrination played no part in the genocide. I highly recommend this all-important work.

Henrik Stenius, Mirja Österberg, Johan Östling, eds. *Nordic Narratives of the Second World War, National Historiographies Revisited* (Lund: Nordic Academic Press, 2011), pp. 176, ISBN: 978-9185509492.
Christiane Grieb (Independent Scholar)

Nordic Narratives of the Second World War: National Historiographies Revisited is exactly what the title promises: an in-depth review of Finland, Denmark, Norway, Iceland, and Sweden's national narratives of the Second World War (WWII). Eight leading historians from these countries present their research in this edited volume. The authors reviewed the national narratives of the Second World War generated in the Nordic countries with the objective to identifying their specifics and commonalities. Concepts of national identity, the role of the nation-state, memory culture, and the moral turn are recurring concepts of identifying a Nordic historiography of WWII. The authors answer questions as to how the then national governments interacted, collaborated or cooperated with the German occupiers, and how national politicians addressed the violent nature of war that the German occupation brought to their countries. They reflect on the ways in which this part of the national histories were viewed by historians, journalists and public narratives, and review how the national interpretations were shaped by the official Cold War policies and new security-doctrines emerged since the 1990s.

The authors utilized four interpretive approaches to advance their argument. First, a comparative review of the national writings among the Nordic countries during and immediately after the Second World War was established to create a departure point for the analysis of these historiographies in their national, as well as contemporary European contexts. Second, the authors engage the readers in a review as to how the war experiences evolved in the national narratives through the lenses of: military operations of the occupying Nazi forces, of resistance movements, and the post-war interpretations of national occupation policies generated during the period up to 1990. Third, these findings are further related to the challenges historiographical writing was exposed to with the end of the Cold War. Since 1990 the national narratives shifted in each of the five countries reviewed. At the core of these discussions are the national revisions of the patriotic narratives as they were once established within the framework of the Western and Eastern European ideological alignments during the Cold War. The different perspectives share an observable "moral turn" in the way the Nordic countries evaluated their involvements on the Second World War. I consider this part of the national discussions the most valuable contribution of Nordic historiography to the writing of a European history of the post-World War II

era. Fourth, further arguments are put forward on how the exposures of national patriotic narratives to the discourse of the “moral turn” became mirrored in identified similarities and fundamental dissimilarities of national deconstruction of patriotic narratives.

In the discussion of the first aspect, the reviewers found that Scandinavian scholars emphasized patriotic, nationalist interpretations which often evolved already during the war as a way of dealing with the occupation. Therefore, the role of occupied nations and responses of Scandinavian wartime politicians were questioned, but often only to result in justifications for collaboration and cooperation activities. During the Cold War era, the historiographical discourse activated by historians was accompanied by public narratives and political agendas formulated under the new post-war agendas of the Nordic countries. With some of these countries gaining (Iceland) or regaining (Denmark, Finland, Norway) their national sovereignty they focused their national history-writing on the paths taken in context to nation building.

As to the second aspect, the authors’ reviewed how national historiography became contextualized to the Cold War period, both up to and after 1990. The war experiences evolved in national narratives of involvement in military operations of the occupying Nazi forces, of resistance movements and in context of the post-war interpretations of national occupation policies generated during the period up to 1990. The reviewed material revealed also that the end of the Cold War demarcated a new periodical constructing point. Now, it was feasible to challenge the established, largely nationalistic historiographies. Thus, histories written since the 1990s focus on the decontextualization of the purely nation-focused narratives. The changing foreign policy alignments that came about with the demise of the Iron Curtain allowed for non-traditional among Nordic narratives. For example, Iceland, and Finland shared the role as ideological demarcation points to the West (USA) and the East (Soviet Union). During the Cold War, the European countries were forced to position their foreign policies in the context of the Western European anti-totalitarian and the Eastern European anti-fascism framework. This resulted in patriotic interpretations of a new nature, which now not only considered the Nazi German occupation, but also the post-war knowledge that its outcome had led to a divided political European master narrative. Thus, the specifics of geography, national politics and geopolitical aspects replaced the nationalist narrative approaches of the pre-1990 era.

The third framework allows one to relate the national historiographies to the changing discourse observable as the “moral turn” since 1990. The “moral turn” set the patriotic, national frameworks of narratives and related national historical consciousness into a broader context of a European history

of the Second World War. The end of the Cold War also dissolved the demarcation lines along which national narratives had been constructed. Most notably, the new European history of WWII inevitably pushed the European extermination policies into the national pasts and questioned the validity of approaching history as an isolated national experience. Previously, the historians in the Nordic countries helped to define national identities after the Second World War in sync with public foreign policies. They often shared the narratives of popular culture that once were proclaimed by the political elite operating in the straitjackets of the two military blocks, uncontested. The “moral turn” challenged this unanimity. Without the justification of patriotic narratives within the ideological frameworks of the Cold War period, the interpretations of wartime national foreign policies were now scrutinized in moralistic terms. New moral statements of national involvements in a no longer patriotic, but rather National-socialist European war, affected the Nordic societies’ historical consciousness as well as the histories written about the war experiences significantly.

The main triggers of the “moral turn” in Nordic historical writing were the end of the Cold War and the new role historians filled in the societal interpretation of national war experiences in all of these countries. The aspects of a shared, a European history became a more prevalent theme. With the “moral turn” being a shared development in all Nordic countries, it can be identified as the main characteristic of Nordic historiography since 1990. It featured not only the deconstruction of purely patriotic histories, but also elevated Nordic histories to national histories of European significance.

Altogether, this edited volume is the best review of the Nordic historiography generated since the German occupation of these countries. The authors identified overarching themes of the Nordic experience of the Second World War in the national narratives of each country while also being able to discuss national characteristics of national history and memory cultures in these countries since 1945. As a result, it does an excellent job at charting the evolution of national narratives of the Scandinavian countries with regards to their experiences in WWII.

Peter Olsthoorn, ed. *Military Ethics and Leadership* (Leiden: Brill, 2017), pp. 307, ISBN: 978-9004339583.

Nicholas S. Miceli (Park University, College of Management)

Peter Olsthoorn has assembled a collection of excellent chapters dealing with military ethics in *Military Ethics and Leadership*. This work will be of interest to the military scholar, and to those doing research in the field of ethics, as it examines outcomes that are practical, oriented towards “real life”, and high stakes in nature. The content provides analyses dealing with training and development, culture, moral and ethical reasoning, and cross-cultural comparisons that are becoming more frequent given the increasing level of multinational and humanitarian operations.

Chapter 1 provides definitions for ethical theories and terms, as well as benefits and deficiencies of approaches using those bases for training personnel. Specifically, the effects of encountered situations and individuals’ dispositions on behavior are considered, as well as the biases affecting how we interpret others’ behaviors (“fundamental attribution error”). The extreme pressure of combat situations is noted and compared to classic psychological experiments. The chapters following are briefly summarized.

Chapter 2 (McDermott & Hart, 2017) deals with the need to train small units to make them more resistant to possibly committing atrocities in stressful situations. The authors note that group pressure in stressful situations can be a strong force for either good or evil. Faced with this, individuals’ resistance to doing evil may not be strong enough without additional training and socialization. McDermott & Hart provide sound recommendations to commanders on how to use group cohesion to reinforce desirable behaviors. Accordingly, they say that ethical leaders have to demonstrate ethical behaviors (p. 43).

Chapter 3 (de Graaff, de Vries, van Bijlevelt & Giebels, 2017) discusses where ethics education and training falls short in application in the field. As discussed in the previous chapters, the high stakes of outcomes, cultural differences between members of multinational forces and indigenous populations, immediacy of the need for a response, and the ambiguity of situations and appropriateness of responses to those situations further complicates the nature of violence inherent to military operations. Given this context, it is particularly difficult to construct training that will cover all the bases needed by personnel. The importance of ethically strong leadership is emphasized (p. 57, 80).

Chapter 4 (Whetham, 2017) examines Anglo-American experience in Afghanistan and the Middle East, and the leadership responses to ethical

challenges encountered in those theaters of operations. Whetham frames the discussion in terms of ethical relativism, drawing on Herodotus' discussion of the funeral practices of the Greeks and Callatians, i.e., cremation versus eating the bodies of the dead. What is "right" and "wrong" depends on one's own cultural standards. Whetham, however, rejects the idea that it is not possible to evaluate others practices as "wrong" due to "cultural imperialism". It is necessary to reject and act upon some behaviors as wrong and prevent them from being committed.

Chapter 5 (Cartagena & Beaty, 2017) discuss the problem of "fragmentation". Fragmentation occurs when a soldier separates their professional life and values from their personal life and values, and there is little or no interaction between the two (p. 106). This is my paraphrasing of their discussion. This chapter would have been improved if the authors had provided a definition of fragmentation up front in their discussion. The main point of their analysis is that to divide personal and professional values instead of integrating them makes it more difficult for the soldier to function effectively, as it results in a more narrowed or truncated functioning of ethical reasoning when a soldier is functioning in a professional capacity. This is seen to be particularly crucial on humanitarian missions. This is seen to be an effect of institutional training and socialization. The authors go on to argue that this form of fragmentation is reflective of how individuals function in Western societies, taking on different roles in their lives (p. 112). Their response to this fragmentation is to encourage the development of integrity and ethical awareness (p. 120).

Chapter 6 (Mileham, 2017) For me, one of the most important points made by Mileham was that:

“... soldiers, sailor and airmen are always human beings as well as citizens and fiduciary agents of the state. Such persons bear personal as well as professional responsibility for their actions, particularly in the context of people acting to receive reconciliation *post bellum* (p. 142).”

In other words, the human costs to all involved are incredibly high, and not to be incurred lightly. This point is made in several of the chapters and is directed toward those who are responsible for initiating violence from a safe distance, on more than one occasion and rightly so. As Mileham goes on to discuss the need for integrity and a personal and professional conscience is critical in those who take up the profession of arms.

Chapter 7 (Boda, 2017) discusses the autonomy of the soldier (individual control over behavior) and military authority (the power or right to command). He references James MacGregor Burns' 1978 text, *Leadership*, which is a classic in the field. The model advanced by Burns and modified by others is presented

as a form of “service leadership”. [Note: In the management literature, this term in English is “servant leadership”.] The discussion focuses on the tension between an autonomous or independent soldier that needs to be convinced to act as the command authority needs them to act to achieve strategic objectives. Boda draws upon St. Augustine and Samuel P. Huntington to demonstrate that soldiers give up certain rights when they contract with the State to become soldiers and take on the duty to defend the State’s interests. Because of this, they agree to obey orders as well.

Chapter 8 (Dörfler-Dierken, 2017) contributed a particularly interesting chapter. Her discussion dealt with *Innere Führung*, which was developed after World War II by Wolf Stefan Traugott Graf von Baudissin in response to the ethical conflicts faced by German soldiers during the war. The main idea of *Innere Führung* is that the individual soldier should be able to serve without having to go against their conscience (p. 168). The regulation reminds soldiers: that they are “citizens in uniform”, and not separate from other Germans; that they only are to use force to secure the peace, i.e., never to kill innocent people; they are to work for security and peace (p. 173). The role of the military as part of society is strongly emphasized. The empirical evidence examined by the authors indicates that most of the soldiers surveyed have positive attitudes toward *Innere Führung* (p. 181). Consistent with other chapters, the need for those personnel in leadership positions to demonstrate ethical behaviors is linked to *esprit de corps*, and its’ effect on unit behavior and performance (p. 183). Most importantly

“German soldiers are educated to know their personal responsibility and they are trained to act in accordance with the law and their personal conscience ... Subordinates are allowed to insist that their superiors act according to the guiding principles of *Innere Führung* (p. 188).”

Given this approach, the German military appears to have a better chance at being well grounded ethically and behaviorally compared to countries that do not base their ethical training on a concept like *Innere Führung*.

Chapter 9 (Kumankov, 2017) works through philosophical means to derive the premise that “intervention is treated as a military operation for human rights defence by permissible forceful methods (p.194).” He views this as the strongest argument to bring to bear of the ones advanced. Working from this premise, the next step is that there are times when good people must take a stand and protect others from “bad guys” (p. 196). Apparently, St. Augustine said it first, but Kumankov is making a good point. Unfortunately, the collective decision-making process to intervene that Kumankov describes is slow and complicated by cultural differences between the decision makers in a multinational force. These differences point out the lack of a set of universal

moral norms, which are what Kumankov points out are necessary to make interventions “truly humanitarian (p. 204).”

Chapter 10 (Wilkes, 2017) begins with the idea that there should be norms about military behavior that are universal, cross-culturally. Then the discussion is framed in terms of how different perspectives can be used to improve the understanding of how professional military ethics are applied. First, guilt and confession are considered. If I understand Wilkes correctly, (p. 212) guilt is considered as a debt to society incurred through the act of bearing arms. In some societies, part of that debt can be mitigated through confession, which serves to reintegrate the soldier back into society (p.212). As Wilkes (p. 220) points out, the military professional deals with guilt at a level that the politicians and civilians will never encounter. Possibly the most important point that Wilkes makes is that if the consequences of behaviors with ethical considerations are not presented as being important in training and socialization, this has the potential to trivialize such outcomes, as well as the training itself (p. 224).

Chapter 11 (de Graaff, den Besten, Giebels & Verweij, 2017) conducted an empirical study of the extant literature on moral judgement in the military context. The results of their search yielded a total of 33 journal articles that were suitable for analysis. Most of the studies took a cognitive approach to moral judgment analysis. The remainder of the studies used the affective or integrative approaches. About half of the studies were qualitative and half were quantitative in method. The samples examined were diverse in terms of nationality or country, military occupational specialty, and rank (enlisted or officer). Almost half of the studies examined ethical situations in combat or deployment situations, while the rest focused on non-combat situations. In the discussion, the authors noted that military subjects are somewhat resistant to cooperating with non-military researchers. They also note that most peer-reviewed papers departed from the cognitive approach and dealing with emotions. They link this to the nature of the military culture. Further, most of the studies examined addressed moral judgments in non-combat settings. This is problematic, as the more critical situations are in combat settings. The authors also note problems due to the need for more studies specifically examining line rather than staff troops. The authors are correct that with multinational and humanitarian operations becoming more frequent, the need for research providing better insight into these situations becomes more pressing.

Chapter 12 (Kashnikov, 2017) provides a thoughtful piece on the declining power of nation-states, the growing power of multinational corporations and other non-state organizations, and a description of how power is taking on a network form. The new form of warfare that he describes is

predominately asymmetric warfare. The world that he describes is beyond Machiavellian; it resembles an Orwellian nightmare, with “global sovereign power” described as being “jealous, spiteful, and vicious (p. 276).” Contrast these qualities with the military virtues of “endurance, virtue, and honour (p. 277).” If the national leadership and citizenry are becoming as degraded as Kashnikov describes, then future unethical behaviors will become inevitable as soldiers (or mercenaries) are placed in wars that should not be fought in the first place. Without a doubt, this is the most discouraging of the chapters in the book, but it is one of the ones that are the most worth reading.

Chapter 13 (Baker, 2017) is of interest. It is an examination of whether special operations forces (SOF) have “particular” or additional ethical challenges for leadership inside and outside the SOF chain of command. SOF should be used in situations when conventional forces cannot be utilized or achieve success. Within this article, those situations are: counterterrorism, special reconnaissance, direct action, and unconventional warfare (p. 290). These situations are special because of the various extremely high-risk environments in which they occur. Success would be deemed impossible for conventional forces (p. 291). Further, SOF working in these environments is isolated from normal support and communications channels and the higher chain of command (p. 292). This requires them to make decisions independently and use unconventional means, as needed, to achieve mission goals. Accordingly, SOF operators are responsible for the ethical content of their decisions and outcomes (p. 292). The author concludes that SOF operators have the same ethical obligations as conventional forces, even though SOF operators operate in higher risk environments (p. 303). The author recommends ethical training, as do most of the other authors. He also indicates that SOF operators must not only be exceptional as warriors, but “exceptional thinkers (p.304).

To summarize:

1. More research in all areas of military ethics is needed. It will be difficult to carry this out. Researchers may want to reach out to faculty at the military academies and service schools to do collaborative research;
2. One reinforcer of ethical behavior may be strong, ethical leadership. While ethical leadership may not always insure ethical behavior, the lack of ethical leadership virtually guarantees the lack of ethical behavior;
3. Training and development for operational ethics should be emphasized and research on how to improve such training should be carried out.

This collection of readings is consequently recommended to persons doing research on military or organizational ethics, as well as related areas in management, psychology, or other social sciences. Of course, military professionals of all branches would do well to read this volume.